Bulletin of Spanish Studies, Volume LXXXI, Number 2, 2004

The Image of Imperial Spain in British Political Thought, 1750–1800*

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Many modern historians have portrayed, with some justification, late eighteenth-century Spain as a French satellite state.[1] Scholars examining the image of Spain in British political thought in this period have tended to concentrate on British fantasies of lucrative and untapped Spanish-American mines and markets.[2] This article argues that Spain played a decisive role in the British political imagination in the late eighteenth century, especially with regard to imperial affairs. It examines the impact of the image of Spain—its political ideas, government policies and empire—on British ideas between 1750 and 1800. The maligned, but recurrent and widely-invoked, image of Spain was a continuity in British political thinking, especially with regard to population, colonial commercial policy and imperial trade relations.[3] What is contended here is that Spanish

* I am grateful for the advice and comments on earlier versions of this essay offered by Emma Rothschild, Alexander Kirshner and two anonymous specialist readers. I also wish to acknowledge the generous material support of the Centre for History and Economics (King's College, Cambridge) and Trinity College, Cambridge.

1 Allan Christelow, 'French Interest in the Spanish Empire During the Ministry of the Duc de Choiseul, 1759–1771', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXI (1941), 515–37 (pp. 532, 535); Allan J. Kuethe and Lowell Blaisdell, 'French Influence and the Origins of Bourbon Colonial Reorganization', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, LXXI (1991), 579–607; Jeremy Adelman, *Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the Atlantic World* (Stanford: Stanford U. P., 1999).

2 A. S. Aiton, 'Spanish Colonial Reorganization Under the Family Compact', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XII (1932), 269–77 (pp. 273, 276); Vincent Harlow shared Aiton's assumption of the 'preponderance of a Franco-Spanish bloc' and the opinion that British 'operations against Spain had been subsidiary, usually designed to reduce her contribution to France's war potential', in *The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763–1793*, 2 vols (London: Longman, Green & Co., 1952), II, 647.

3 John Gascoigne, *Science in the Service of Empire: Joseph Banks, the British State and the Uses of Science in the Age of Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1998), 168; Helen Taft Manning, *British Colonial Government after the American Revolution 1782–1820* (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1933), 8; on foreign (mainly continental) perceptions of Spain, see

ISSN 1475-3820 print/ISSN 1478-3428 online/04/02/000187-28
 DOI: 10.1080/1475382042000206574

imperial re-organization helped to shape British ideas and that its significance was greater than the 'fantasy', 'fitful dream' and 'grand design to liberate Spanish colonies in America, to win their goodwill, their emulation and their markets'.[4]

This article attempts to show that Spain's image as a tyrannical and commercially-backward empire played a prominent role as Britain re-evaluated its own empire toward the end of the eighteenth century. The period between 1763 and 1798 is particularly crucial because there was a growing awareness in Britain, confronting its own recalcitrant colonies in North America, that Spain's empire had, through comprehensive reform, gained strength and reversed its decline. The first section of this article charts the growing stature of imperial considerations in British population debates, particularly the treatment of territorial expansion and emigration. It seeks to demonstrate two things: first, the supposedly deleterious effect of colonialism on metropolitan Spain's population was invoked by writers from David Hume to Thomas Malthus, but its didactic function changed over time; second, the belief that Spain's territorial expansion had led to moral decrepitude which, in turn, triggered depopulation, was replaced by a view that recognized natural, not moral, constraints on population growth.

The second section explores the shifting ideological function of Spain's empire in British debates related to colonial commerce from 1763 until the American Revolution, focusing on the writing of Thomas Pownall and Adam Smith. Also discussed is the reverberation of Spain's imperial reform in the history of Europe's contact with the New World written in the 1770s by William Robertson and contrasts his defence of the Spanish Monarchy with that of Abbé Raynal, whose work enjoyed great popularity in Britain.

The third section suggests ideas concerning population, colonial commerce and Spain's empire were not only important in metropolitan British intellectual circles, but also were vital in debates about colonial administration between 'men on the spot' and metropolitan decision-makers. These considerations were especially crucial on the Anglo-Spanish frontier in North America during the gubernatorial tenure of George Johnstone in British West Florida between 1764 and 1767. Johnstone contended that the relaxation of colonial monopoly and the encouragement

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Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish American Social and Political Theory 1513–1830* (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1990).

4 Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire*, II, 615, 661; Richard Drayton suggests that 'European policy, and in particular the post-1763 Bourbon reform program, stimulated many British initiatives [...] the construction of an "improving" British imperialism would draw quietly on Bourbon initiatives undertaken by Choiseul', in *Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain and the 'Improvement' of the World* (New Haven/London: Yale U. P., 2000), 91–92. This article draws heavily on Drayton's observation, but also emphasizes an autonomous and re-invigorated Spain as an independent entity influencing British imperial ideas.

of West Florida's commerce with the Spanish colonial cities of Havana, New Orleans and Vera Cruz would augment the population and economic prosperity of his fledgling colony. After leaving West Florida to become a loquacious Member of Parliament, the image of the Spanish empire remained a prominent feature of Johnstone's political rhetoric.

In a skirmish of the broader Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns in the eighteenth century, British writers disputed the causes of population increase while concurring that a large and increasing population indicated a society's well-being and presaged its economic development. Population questions were at the centre of British thought and addressed not only the benefits of rising or falling population, but also the impact of population size on national strength and the feasibility of extra-territorial expansion. Territorial expansion was very important to British population debates, and Spain's empire was at the heart of those considerations. The fear that emigration to North America was draining the population of the mother country and attenuating its strength was so pervasive that Parliament contemplated a ban on emigration in late 1773.[5] These population movements encouraged comparisons between the impact of empire on Britain and Spain: British writers wrestled with the notion that Spain's seventeenth-century population and political decline coincided with its imperial expansion and asserted that there existed a causal relation between these phenomena. National vitality and population, therefore, were correlated.

In the realm of ideas, Montesquieu's statements concerning Spain's population decline were one of the jumping off points for British debates. In *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), Montesquieu (1689–1755) claimed that Spain suffered 'uninterrupted decline' due to its reliance on the 'internal and physical vice' of mineral wealth, especially gold, from the mines of its New World colonies. Spain's dissipated decadence was proportionate to its mineral dependence and its colonies developed rapidly at the expense of the mother country. This produced a situation in which 'the Indies and Spain are two powers under the same master, but the Indies are the principal one, and Spain is only secondary'. This trend was exacerbated by Spain's 'internal vice of bad government' which depressed the population of Spain. For Montesquieu, Spain's plight was typical of modern Europe whose population had declined since antiquity.[6]

David Hume (1711–1776) agreed with many of Montesquieu's basic

5 Although a ban was never formally proposed, the Privy Council moved to impede land speculation by stopping its policy of land grants, which had spawned numerous pernicious re-settlement schemes, and began to sell lands 'in officially surveyed plots, at public auction at published prices'. See Bernard Bailyn, *The Peopling of British North America: An Introduction* (New York: Knopf, 1986), 73.

6 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*. trans. and ed. A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller and H. S. Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1997), 393, 396, 454; the first English translation of *Spirit* was completed by Thomas Nugent in 1750.

tenets, but argued that modern societies were more populous than those of antiquity. He remarked that 'every wise, just and mild government, by rendering the condition of its subjects easy and secure, will always abound most in people, as well as in commodities and riches'.[7] Hume asserted that 'the most natural way, surely, of encouraging husbandry', more prevalent in modern than ancient societies, was 'to excite other kinds of industry, and thereby afford the labourer a ready market for his commodities, and a return of such goods as may contribute to his pleasure and enjoyment'. Instead of concentrating on the pernicious effects of luxury, however, Hume lauded commerce's beneficent contributions to 'improvements and refinements', including 'the discovery of new worlds', in promoting 'propagation and increase'. Nevertheless, Hume warned of the inevitable impact of territorial expansion, predicting 'there necessarily arise many capitals, in the remoter provinces, whither all the inhabitants, except a few courtiers, repair for fortune, education, and amusement'. For Hume, imperial expansion would not necessarily lead to depopulation, but it would hasten the dissolution of a centralized empire. Expansion in itself would not influence population because, in Hume's system national fortune depended on political institutions, not manners or morals.[8] This premise led him to reject Montesquieu's depiction of the Spanish empire.

Hume attacked the idea of the Spanish empire as a siphon of Iberia's strength. Drawing attention to Spanish political economist Jerónimo Uztáriz's *Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs* (1724) in a footnote, which Malthus would later exploit, Hume refuted the idea that imperial expansion had depopulated Spain, noting 'the provinces of Spain, which send most people to the Indies, are most populous; which proceeds from their superior riches'. Spain's territorial enlargement did not necessarily drain its population. Instead, Hume suggested, Spain's depopulation was a more complex affair. Even Spain, Hume said sarcastically, 'decayed from what it was three centuries ago', supported a larger population than when it was a 'restless, turbulent, and unsettled' outpost of the Roman empire. This consideration offered small consolation to reformers, such as Uztáriz, who strove to reverse Spain's fortunes and increase its population.[9]

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7 David Hume, 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations', in *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. Eugene Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), 382; Hume's essay was a response to Robert Wallace's argument which was delivered as a paper to the Philosophical Society of Edinburgh. Hume's essay was published before Wallace's paper which was then revised to take into account Hume's criticisms. On this topic see D. V. Glass, *Numbering the People: The Eighteenth-Century Population Controversy and the Development of Census and Vital Statistics in Britain* (Saxon: House & Farnborough, 1973), 24.

8 Hume, 'Populousness', 419, 420, 448; see also Duncan Forbes, *Hume's Philosophical Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1975).

9 Hume, 'Populousness', 382, 455; this view was the opposite of the one expressed in Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*: 'colonies usually have the effect of weakening the mother

Uztáriz's primary preoccupation concerned the relation of national economic prosperity to population size. He asserted that a more populous Spain could generate a larger tax revenue and thus enhance the power of the state. 'As the country rendered more populous by means of manufactures', he argued, 'there would ensue an increase of the revenue, arising out of the more frequent sales and purchases and larger consumption of commodities and fruits'. Uztáriz (1670–1732) maintained that population and prosperity complemented each other and he suggested that population could be augmented through immigration: 'as soon as trade begins to flourish and people are sure of employment, there will always come into us large and constant supplies of Catholicks from abroad, who are skillful in the fabricks and their marrying and settling in Spain with their families, is a sure and safe way to increase the inhabitants considerably'. But Uztáriz argued that policy blunders, not colonial possessions *per se*, had caused Spain's precipitous decline: 'the Indies are not the thing that enervates and dispeoples Spain, but the commodities by which foreigners have drained us of money, and destroyed our manufactories at the same time that our heavy taxes continue'.[10] For Uztáriz, neither reliance on gold nor territorial expansion caused depopulation. Rather, he lamented Spain's uncompetitive economy, misgovernance, and failure to encourage maritime trade as the underlying problems. The expansion of Spanish maritime commerce, he wrote, would usher in an era of economic prosperity and population growth. Uztáriz's insights concerning Spain's population, however, were not used by British writers after Hume.

Robert Wallace (1697–1771) disagreed with Hume and asserted that 'mankind must have been much more numerous at a certain period already past, than they have ever been', attributing modern 'paucity' to a confluence of physical restraints and 'moral' causes.[11] For Wallace, territorial expansion was less important than the mode of production operating in the colonies—blaming the pernicious effects of gold for Spain's demise. Wallace championed 'simplicity and taste among private citizens' and criticized

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country without adding to the population of the country in which they are established'; two English translations of Uztaríz's treatise appeared shortly before Hume's essay was published: the first London edition was completed by John Kippax in 1751 and another translation, undertaken by George Faulkner, was published in Dublin in 1752.

10 Jerónimo de Uztáriz, *The Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs*, trans. John Kippax, 2 vols (London, 1751), I, 38–39, 49; see also A. V. Castillo, *Geronimo de Uztáríz—Economist* (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1980); Franco Venturi, 'Spanish and Italian Economists and Reformers in the Eighteenth Century', in his *Italy and the Enlightenment: Studies in a Cosmopolitan Century* (New York: New York Univ., 1972).

11 Robert Wallace, *A Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind in Ancient and Modern Times: In Which the Superior Populousness of Antiquity is Maintained* (Edinburgh, 1753), 11–12.

Spain's dependence on gold.[12] Like Montesquieu, however, he recognized the role of arbitrariness and despotism in population fluctuation. He therefore derided Spain's 'banishment' of 200,000 Jewish families in 1492 and the expulsion of 900,000 'Moors' in 1610–11 as a 'remarkable instance of cruelty, folly, and madness'.[13] Wallace's explanation for Spain's depopulation remained popular through the 1780s: Townsend's travelogue of Spain noted 'persecution [as] a powerful cause of depopulation; and, like the national prejudice against strangers, prevents many useful subjects from being added to the state'. Wallace's most original contribution with regard to Spain was his claim that despotism's supposedly beneficent effects were, in practice, inimical to population growth. In Spain, he contended, 'peace commonly degenerates into indolence; order is nothing but dread of the tyrant's power; as there is little security, industry seldom flourishes […] how can populousness be expected in nations destitute of industry and activity?'.[14] In this way, Wallace disparaged political despotism as a check on population growth.

Benjamin Franklin approached population questions in the context of empire, arguing that colonial North America could remain a hinterland in perpetuity, its population and agricultural production expanding continuously, a burgeoning market for British manufactures. In Franklin's view, imperial expansion hastened population increase and augmented national strength. 'Unprejudic'd men', Franklin insisted, recognized the futility of 'penal and prohibitory laws' designed 'to prevent manufactures in a country whose inhabitants surpass the number than can subsist by the husbandry of it'. Franklin maintained that the availability of free land would act as a spur to population and agricultural production. Territorial expansion, therefore, would inhibit the efflorescence of indigenous manufactures in America.[15]

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12 Wallace, *Dissertation*, 17, 22; Wallace, along with Montesquieu and Hume, argued that property distribution was a major factor in determining population growth. As F. Rosen points out, Malthus' 'emphasis on the constancy of the operation of the property principle' excluded consideration of land distribution as a determinant of population size. See Rosen, 'The Principle of Population as Political Theory: Godwin's *Of Population* and the Malthusian Controversy', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXXI (1970), 33–48 (p. 47); for French population debates, see J. J. Spengler, *French Predecessors of Malthus: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Wage and Population Theory* (Durham, NC: Duke U. P., 1942), esp. pp. 29–53 and 216–17.

13 Wallace, *Dissertation*, 60, 220.

14 Joseph Townsend, *A Journey through Spain in the Years 1786 and 1787*, 2 vols, (London, 1792), II, 244. Townsend (1739–1816); Wallace, *Dissertation*, 250.

15 Benjamin Franklin, *The Interest of Great Britain Considered, With Regard to her Colonies, and the Acquisitions of Canada and Guadaloupe; to which are added, Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries & C.* (London, 1760), 17, 23, 56, 24; Franklin's original population essay (1751) was instigated by Parliament's 'enactment of a law restraining the development of colonial ironworks', according to Douglas Anderson, *The Radical Enlightenments of Benjamin Franklin* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins U. P., 1997), 167.

The image of Spain also featured prominently in Franklin's argument: first, he rejected Wallace's and Hume's rationale for Spain's population decline, concluding 'the thinness of the inhabitants of Spain, is owing to national pride and idleness and other causes, rather than to the expulsion of the Moors, or to the making of new settlements';[16] second, Franklin argued for the benefit of shared cultural traits in maintaining the docile loyalty of colonies: 'had the Netherlands been peopled from Spain, the worst oppression had probably not provoked them to wish a separation of government' even though Spain possessed the 'very worst of governments, the worst of politicks in the last century'.[17] For Franklin, Spain's failure to 'people' the Netherlands, or even to inculcate its national values, underpinned the demise of its empire. Furthermore, he maintained that the advantages of cultural links mitigated despotism's excesses.

The acquisition of new territory carved from Spain's vast and sparsely-inhabited North-American empire in 1763 propelled the population question into policy debates. Many of Franklin's propositions were borrowed by Thomas Whately, George Grenville's secretary, who argued that 'the object of government', in places like East and West Florida, should be 'to tempt inhabitants thither; and to encourage population', necessitating that land 'should be granted on easy terms of settlement'. Spain had failed to take these steps and thus had forfeited the benefits of these territories. Whately argued that government should promote population for economic and strategic advantage: by encouraging agrarian production, the colonies 'will have neither hands, not be at leisure to turn to manufactures: the connection with the mother country is thereby strengthened'.[18] Arthur Young (1741–1820), perhaps the epoch's most important proponent of agricultural improvement, depicted Spain as an

16 Franklin, *The Interest of Great Britain*, 55; ridding Spain of this stigma of indolence was an over-riding obsession of the eighteenth-century Spanish state, culminating in a campaign to 'destroy prejudices against the mechanic arts' by 'adjusting and modifying' the classic concept of honor. Charles III decreed crafts and manual trades 'honest and honorable' in 1783. See William J. Callahan, *Honor, Commerce and Industry in Eighteenth-Century Spain* (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1972), 52–56.

17 Franklin, *The Interest of Great Britain*, 40.

18 Thomas Whately, *Regulations Lately Made Concerning the Colonies, and the Taxes Imposed Upon Them, Considered* (London, 1765), 5, 8; Whately was a Minister of Parliament from 1761–1772 and was in 1764–1765 secretary to Lord Grenville. See Ian R. Christie, 'A Vision of Empire: Thomas Whately's *Regulations Lately Made Concerning the Colonies*', *English Historical Review*, CXIII (1998), 300–20; Britain had encountered difficulties making former Spanish colonies prosperous under British rule before 1763. I have found an anonymous document at the Public Record Office from the late 1750s which complains of this problem: 'Minorca has already cost us above three millions and yet it is nearly in the same rude and uncultured state as we found it in the year 1708, but rather more depopulated, the Spaniards who inhabit it are as proud as indolent, as beggarly as litigious and as averse to our religion and industry as they were on the day we took them', in C.O. 174/1, fol. 65, 'A Plan for Settling the Island of Minorca with a Sett of Substantial and Industrious Inhabitants'.

albatross foreshadowing the perils of non-agrarian, mineral-dependent empire. Young contrasted Great Britain and Spain: 'those mountains of precious metals most indubitably tended greatly to dispeople Old Spain' because 'the inducement is so shining, the idea of speedy and immense riches so bewitching that numbers go who could well maintain themselves at home, exchanging the small profits of industry for the imaginary ones of idleness'. British emigrants, by contrast, 'do not change industry for idleness' because of the labour-intensive nature of agricultural work.[19] Spaniards were not, as Franklin supposed, incorrigibly 'indolent'; rather, like Wallace, Young was convinced that specific types of economic activity would encourage population.

By the 1780s, however, the spectre of overpopulation, instead of depopulation, with which Spain was associated, became wide-spread and was analogized to a 'human body grown fat and unwieldy by indolence and indulgence'.[20] Thomas Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Population* (1798) transformed the terms of the population debate and rendered obsolete the discussion of the detrimental effects of expansion on population. Malthus (1766–1834) contended that a 'greater part of Europe is more populous now than it was in former times [because] the industry of the inhabitants has made these countries produce a greater quantity for human subsistence'. Malthus recognized the interplay of 'physical' and 'moral' factors, but rejected the idea that limitless human improvement could eliminate the physical obstacles and natural barriers to population growth. Natural constraints, in Malthus' view, would limit population regardless of the advance of political ideas. He claimed that it was an 'error' to fail to 'discriminate between a small improvement, the limit of which is undefined, and an improvement really unlimited'. It was equally egregious to 'attribute almost all the vices and misery that are seen in civil society to human institutions'.[21] Malthus effectively confuted those who maintained expansion and population had a causal relation and thereby diminished the importance of moral factors in population growth. This move permitted him to re-examine Spain's population history and to diminish the relevance of its mineral-dependent economy and absolutist political system in its overseas dominions to the ebb and flow of its population.

Malthus repeated the standard unflattering stereotypes of Spanish imperialism discussed above, but his population theory exonerated Spain from responsibility for depressing population. Whereas previous theorists blamed Spain's absolutist government for its depopulation and stressed its

19 Arthur Young, *Political Essays Concerning the Present State of the British Empire* (London, 1772), 434–35.

20 Anon., *Political Observations on the Population of Countries* (London, 1782), 14.

21 Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet and other Writers* (London: Penguin, 1970[1st ed. 1798]), 86, 129, 133.

economic backwardness, Malthus accepted these verdicts, but minimized their explanatory significance:

> No settlements could have been worse managed than those of Spain in Mexico, Peru and Quito. The tyranny, superstition and vices of the mother country were introduced in ample quantities among her children. Exorbitant taxes were exacted by the Crown. The most arbitrary restrictions were imposed on her trade. And the governors were not behind hand in rapacity and extortion for themselves as well as their master. Yet, under all these difficulties, the colonies made a quick progress in population.[22]

The cultural failure of Spain, distinguished by arbitrary management and guided by destructive precepts of political economy, was outstripped by environmental determinants. Indeed, Iberian Spain had benefited both from territorial expansion and emigration: Malthus mentioned that 'it has been particularly remarked that the two Spanish provinces from which the greatest number of people emigrated to America became in consequence more populous'.[23] This quotation, a paraphrase of Hume's reference to Uztáriz, demonstrates the persistence of Spain's empire in British population debates.

Malthus explained why Spanish America's population was exceeded by British North America whose 'rapidity of increase [was] probably without parallel in history'. Malthus conceded the confluence of 'plenty of good land' and, unlike in Spanish America, political institutions 'favorable to the alienation and division of property'. He faulted other writers, however, for misdiagnosing North America's 'happiness', denigrating the importance of the 'peculiar degree of civilization' and emphasizing the 'peculiarity of their situation, as new colonies, upon their having a great plenty of uncultivated land'. Physical factors, for Malthus, outweighed human agency. 'The situation of new colonies, well-governed', Malthus claimed, 'is a bloom of youth that no efforts can arrest'. He recognized 'many modes of treatment' that contribute to 'accelerate or retard the approaches of age, but there can be no chance of success, in any mode that could be devised, for keeping either of them in perpetual youth'.[24] Eventually every society, whether misgoverned like Spanish America or nurtured like British North America, would reach its natural carrying capacity. In the final analysis, Malthus suggested, Spain's political despotism and economic imbecility did not determine unilaterally its population. Before the publication of Malthus's *Essay* in 1798, then, British writers had concurred that the rise of the Spanish empire had triggered population decline, but disagreed which

22 Malthus, *Essay*, 104.
23 *Ibid.*, 107.
24 *Ibid.*, 105, 197.

aspect of imperial expansion—autocratic government, mineral-dependent prosperity, or territorial enlargement—would be held accountable for this phenomenon. In the next section, the significance of the Spanish empire, embarking on a programme of sweeping reform, in the late eighteenth-century British political imagination is investigated and it is suggested that Spain's new-found dynamism impacted British debates on colonial commerce and provoked contemporary historians to revise their accounts of the Spanish empire's development.

Since the sixteenth century, Spain had been regarded suspiciously by British observers as an aspirant to universal monarchy, a barbarous destroyer of America's indigenous peoples and, according to Anthony Pagden, an 'inflexible, illiberal, and ultimately corrupting tyranny'. British depictions of Spain invariably made use of the deeply-entrenched Black Legend concerning its rapacious conduct in the New World. This image was sustained through anti-Spanish sentiment arising from fierce, though decreasingly articulated, religious antagonism and imperial rivalry. The British attitude toward Spain was complex, contrasting its decline with its still potent resources. In a widely-circulated tract written during the War of Jenkins' Ear, John Campbell warned that Spain's decline was attributable to 'errors in government, which should incline the other nations to beware of falling into a like condition'. He noted, however, that Spain remained a viable 'potentate possessed of mighty advantages' that only wanted 'a ministry capable of using and improving them'.[25] Spain's imperial muscle had atrophied, but still posed a credible threat.

Whereas many spectators in Britain who watched Spain eagerly awaited unrestricted access to its American markets, the prospect of British dominion over those provinces was disparaged: 'the possession of South America would be our bane; which, could a wish accomplish we ought not to hesitate, in a public capacity to decline'. Britain would not be immune to the conditions which had rendered the Spaniards 'slothful, wretched and enervated, their parent country a desert, their colonies in a manner a sepulcher'.[26] Notwithstanding bitter disputes over the Falkland Islands and the Mosquito Coast, British policy-makers and intellectuals modified their previously hostile attitude toward Spain after 1763. A more balanced, and less virulent, critique of the Spanish empire emerged. The transformation of British ideas about colonial commerce and administration led to engagement with Spain's imperial experience and,

25 Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France, c.1500–1800* (New Haven/London: Yale U. P., 1995), 87, 116; on the Black Legend in England, see Colin Steele, *English Interpreters of the Iberian New World from Purchas to Stevens: A Bibliographical Study 1603–1726* (Oxford: Dolphin Book Co., 1975), 21, 108–09; William S. Maltby, *The Black Legend in England: The Development of Anti-Spanish Sentiment 1558–1660* (Durham, NC: Duke U. P., 1971), 4, 31, 63; John Campbell, *A Concise History of Spanish America* (London: Dawson's, 1972), 79.

26 Anon., *Reflections on the Terms of Peace* (London, 1763), 25–26.

less frequently, with the economic ideas animating its comprehensive restructuring. The more tolerant intellectual attitude, however, always was contingent on peaceful Anglo-Spanish relations. Indeed, Spain's intervention on behalf of the rebellious North-American colonies in 1779 instigated Edmund Burke to rebuke this generous tendency in the House of Commons. 'Oh how we have been deceived!' he exclaimed, 'how have we slept night after night, and dreamt of the faith of Spain! How long have ministry retired to their beds, full of wholesome advice and admonition on that precarious point, and waked up morning after morning trumpeting out their assurances on the pacific disposition of Spain!'.[27]

This optimism, repudiated by Burke as a dream, originated in Spain's economic revival and administrative reform, inaugurated by Charles III in 1759. His 'incredible efforts to restore his marine, which in his brother's lifetime, had gone to decay' were 'notorious all over Europe'. This resuscitation also was perceived as a boon to Anglo-Spanish relations, gaining the approbation of those who perceived His Catholic Majesty's commitment to the 'arts of peace; he is endeavoring both to cultivate and protect commerce […] the interests of his people point out the friendship of Great Britain, as the surest means of their happiness and safety'.[28] But enthusiasm about Spain's political situation did not translate into an optimistic appraisal in economic matters.

British writers disparaged Spain's failure to exploit the prodigious natural wealth of its empire. Myriad explanations circulated for this confounding result between 1763 and 1798, but the chief one remained constant. Edward Clarke identified this 'great error' as a failure to acknowledge 'industry, manual labour and the arts are more beneficial and truer sources of wealth, than the richest mines of gold and silver […] in consequence of which, the country becoming daily less populous, their marine and military strength soon declined'. None the less, Clarke concluded, 'the Spanish ministry hath been fully sensible of this fatal mistake, and hath endeavored to raise a spirit of industry among the people, by promoting the establishment of manufactures in various parts of the kingdom'. Yet in the late 1780s, Joseph Townsend, a sympathetic observer, ruefully remarked that 'no country ever invented a more ruinous system of finance, or one less friendly to manufactures and to commerce'. Indeed, the reforms undertaken were deemed defective or outmoded, Spain's 'best political writers resemble lag hounds hunting the stale scent whilst the fleetest are already in possession of the game'. Spain's efforts

27 *Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803* (London, 1814), XX (1779), 896.

28 Anon., *The Conduct of a Right Honorable Gentleman* (London, 1762), 72; John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain 1700–1808* (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1989), 247, 252–53; Anon., *A Letter to the Right Honorable the Earl of B***, on a Late Important Resignation, and its Probable Consequences* (London, 1761), 59.

were stymied by the 'rising industry, and consequent prosperity of rival nations […] [which] grew into greatness; and, like the spreading oak casting a shade on more weakly saplings, did not suffer them to rise'. This perception, however, was inaccurate, and the last quarter of the eighteenth century was a period of unprecedented growth and prosperity for the Spanish empire, a change largely attributable to the influence of new ideas concerning political economy on government policy.[29]

Eighteenth-century Spanish ministers were committed to the commercial rejuvenation of the stagnating empire and sought to replace the diffuse and unwieldy structures of government with a central bureaucracy centred at Madrid. By the 1750s, as David Brading has argued, these reformers 'launched a fierce attack upon the privileged bodies and private institutions' which had buttressed the 'disorderly and antiquated Habsburg patrimony'. Increased militarization, a crackdown on clerical power, the creation of crown monopolies, and the employment of salaried officials to administer these reforms, however, were its most visible results.[30] As Spain commenced this period of reform, British writers about empire reconsidered the link between British commerce and foreign colonies. After 1763, there was a gradual re-evaluation of the system of colonial monopoly in operation between Great Britain and its colonies, an arrangement enforced by the seventeenth-century Navigation Acts which prohibited all commerce with foreign colonies and merchandise-laden vessels.

In the realm of ideas, Spain's empire played a critical role in this reconsideration: Thomas Pownall, who served as Governor of Massachusetts in the 1750s, penned his often-revised *The Administration of Colonies* (1764) promoting the preservation of Great Britain's advantage over its rapidly growing colonies through comprehensive, yet conservative, reform. The Spanish empire figured prominently in his proposals for British imperial reorganization. Pownall perceived the British empire's 'center of power' would shift gradually toward America, requiring the formation of 'one general system of dominion by an union of Great Britain and her colonies'.[31] While primarily favouring colonial monopoly, he argued

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29 Edward Clarke, *Letters Concerning the Spanish Nation* (London, 1763), 262; Townsend, *A Journey through Spain*, II, 226, 394, 252; J. Fisher, *Economic Aspects of Spanish Imperialism in America 1492–1810* (Liverpool: Liverpool U. P., 1997), 197; for an opposing view which maintains that these ideas had 'none or very little' influence on policy, see G. J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade 1700–1789* (London: Macmillan, 1979), 219.

30 D. A. Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico 1763–1810* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1971), 25; R. A. Humphreys, 'The Fall of the Spanish American Empire', in *Tradition and Revolt in Latin America and Other Essays* (London: Athlone Press, 1969), 78–83; see also Stanley Stein and Barbara Stein, *Silver, Trade and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins U. P., 2001).

31 Thomas Pownall, *The Administration of Colonies* (London, 1768 [1st ed. 1764]), 37; Pownall (1722–1805) took his degree from Trinity College, Cambridge in 1743 and, after a brief stint at the Board of Trade, under his brother John Pownall, served as Governor of

the 'safest and wisest measure which government can take, is not to discourage or obstruct that channel through which silver flows into the colonies'[32] which derived from Spain's possessions in the New World. British colonial development could not afford to ignore Spain's imperial resources, especially its mineral wealth, and Pownall sought to modify the Navigation Acts to facilitate greater 'trade of the colonies of the several maritime powers amongst each other'. Pownall specified the necessity of 'such trade as supplies the Spanish provinces with British goods and provisions, as supplies the British colonies with Spanish silver' and contended it was a 'duty of government to permit, nay, even to encourage, under proper regulations, these branches of trade'. Although these proposals appear to depart from mercantilist orthodoxy, Pownall envisaged inter-colonial trade 'to create a necessary dependence in the trade and culture of those colonies for their supplies on the British commerce'.[33] Indeed, Pownall feared that failure to permit Spanish silver into the British colonial system could force the colonies to develop a manufacturing sector.

Adam Smith (1723–1790) repudiated the Spanish colonial system and, in his deprecation of mercantilism, asserted that monopoly of colonial commerce is a 'dead weight', retarding the prosperity of the colony by raising the price of its produce abroad. In this way, it 'cramps' and 'encumbers the industry of all countries'. Smith acknowledged colonialism as a 'general advantage' to Europe's economy, facilitating 'the increase of its enjoyments' and 'the augmentation of its industry', but he claimed that monopoly 'keeps [those advantages] down below what they would otherwise rise to in the case of a free trade'. Furthermore, it 'renders less secure' the long-term prosperity of the colonial power because 'her commerce, instead of running in a great number of small channels, has been taught to run principally in one great channel'. The costs of military defence, Smith contended, are exorbitant, profligate burdens on home taxpayers and consumers.[34] Smith employed Spain as a test case for monopoly's defects

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Massachusetts from 1757–1760.

32 Pownall, *Colonies*, 182, 226; indeed, this was *status quo*: as Christelow records, 'within the British empire itself […] the wheels of commerce were kept moving fairly smoothly by the constant lubrication provided by the steady influx of new supplies of money through illicit trade with the Spanish empire', in 'Contraband Trade Between Jamaica and the Spanish Main, and the Free Port Act of 1766', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXII (1942), 309–43 (p. 311).

33 Pownall, *Administration*, 308–09; G. H. Guttridge, 'Thomas Pownall's *The Administration of Colonies*: the Six Editions', *William and Mary Quarterly*, XXIX (1969), 31–46 (p. 36).

34 Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, 2 vols (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1976), II, 592, 591, 594, 604; see also, Robert Sidney Smith, '*The Wealth of Nations* in Spain and Hispanic America, 1780–1830', *Journal of Political Economy*, LXV (1957), 99–124 (p. 104); Klaus E. Knorr, *British Colonial Theories 1570–1850* (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 183; and Donald Winch, *Classical Political Economy and Colonies* (London: L.S.E. Press, 1965), 13; *Scotland and America in the Age of*

that 'have nearly overbalanced the natural good effects of the colonial trade'. His observation encapsulated the pervasive notion that Spain's empire was improperly acquired and maintained, certainly contrary to the British self-perception, to borrow David Armitage's description, of an 'oceanic empire of trade and settlement, not an empire of conquest'.[35]

Smith's attitude toward colonies, conceding their benefit as producers of raw materials but repudiating closed trade as deleterious, permeated the subsequent debate over their viability in Britain. Pownall, in a widely-distributed open letter, reprimanded Smith and claimed *The Wealth of Nations* espoused not merely 'breaking up the monopoly' but a 'dismemberment of the empire, by giving up the dominion over our colonies'. Pownall derided this 'prompt and hasty conclusion', asserting it resembled the 'puzzled inexperience of an unpracticed surgeon, who is more ready with his amputation knife, than prepared in the skill of healing medicines'.[36]

Britain could not ignore its continental trading partners and Anglo-Spanish belligerence had not reduced the importance of their mutual trade in the 1780s: Britain remained Spain's largest customer whereas Spain was Britain's fifth largest continental trading partner.[37] The period after the American Revolution witnessed attempts by the British government to establish commercial treaties with European states. Although Britain successfully induced France to sign an agreement, an Anglo-Spanish treaty never materialized. Letters from the British emissary to ministers in London during these prolonged, and ultimately failed, commercial treaty negotiations in the 1780s suggest the impact of Spanish imperial ideas on the commercial precepts held by the British government and the importance of ideas in policy-making.

Robert Liston, secretary to the ambassador extraordinary in Madrid, complained of the stubborn attitude of the chief Spanish minister, Count Floridablanca, on the subject of commerce. He explained that the irreconcilable difference between British and Spanish economic ideas had led to an impasse in the negotiations. Liston lamented that Floridablanca's

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Enlightenment, ed. Richard Sher and Jeffrey Smitten (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. P., 1990), 153; R.C. Simmons, ' "A Sett of Exchanges": Adam Smith and the Colonisation of the Americas', *Storia Nordamericana*, IV (1987), 57–69; for an important recent examination of Smith, see Emma Rothschild, *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard U. P., 2001).

35 Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, I, 609–10; David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 2000), 3, 8; on additional British perceptions of colonization, see G. B. Paquette, 'Hegel's Analysis of Colonialism and its Roots in Scottish Political Economy', *Clio*, XXXII, No. 4 (2003), forthcoming.

36 Thomas Pownall, *A Letter from Governor Pownall to Adam Smith* (London, 1776), 37.

37 John Ehrman, *The British Government and Commercial Negotiations with Europe 1783–1793* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1962), 18.

'ideas on the subject of commerce and manufactures of his country have been derived from a book published a good many years ago under the title of *Proyecto Economico*'. This treatise, written by Bernardo Ward, had argued for the rigid exclusion of all non-essential foreign products from Spain's far-flung markets. A protectionist policy, Ward asserted, would facilitate the rapid growth of Spanish manufactures. Liston confided to Lord Carmarthen, Britain's foreign secretary, that there was not 'any intelligence more useful than an account of [Ward's] sentiments':

> The book includes the substance of what has been written by the best English and French authors on similar subjects. The Spanish writers that have generally appeared since have generally borrowed their systems from Mr. Ward, and the different plans of improvement that have been adopted by Count Floridablanca and his immediate predecessors in the ministry have been all drawn from the same source. Perhaps the principal defect of Mr. Ward's performance is that he is sanguine to excess, and that he has encouraged the Court of Spain to undertake with precipitation plans too numerous and extensive by holding out an illusive prospect of success, or too great facility, in the execution of the measures proposed.[38]

Liston did not condemn the aims of Ward's treatise, but criticized its 'sanguine' predictions which had caused Spanish ministers to overestimate the benefits of their protectionist policy and to refuse consideration of freer trade with other European states. Carmarthen replied that he hoped that Floridablanca's principles would prove malleable and reminded Liston that 'it is the object of this negotiation to alter the system of both countries in these respects, and thereby to open a more liberal commercial intercourse between them'.[39] By the late 1780s, it appears, British preoccupation with the Spanish Empire stemmed from a conviction that rejuvenated Spanish colonies eventually could become valuable trading partners.[40] Spain was

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38 Robert Liston to Marquis of Carmarthen, 30 June 1787, F.O. 72/10; Liston (1742–1836) was educated at Edinburgh University and enjoyed a distinguished diplomatic career: he was secretary of the embassy in Madrid from 1783–1788 and, after stints in Stockholm and Constantinople, became ambassador extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Washington from 1796–1802; Francis Osborne (1751–1799), Marquis of Carmarthen and, after 1789, 5th Duke of Leeds, was Foreign Secretary under Pitt between 1783–1791.

39 Carmarthen to Liston, 11 September 1787, F.O. 72/11.

40 Even in 1806, Latin America accounted for a paltry two percent of British commerce whereas its embargo had caused Spain's transatlantic trade to slump to twenty percent of its normal level. See Rory Miller, *Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London/New York: Longman Books, 1993), 41; David Ringrose, *Spain, Europe and the Spanish Miracle, 1700–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1996), 122; only in the mid-nineteenth century, according to D. C. M. Platt, did Britain's trading relationship with Latin America take off. The first British aspirants to economic penetration encountered 'overstocked markets, where so few real, permanent customers existed', in Platt, *Latin America and British Trade 1806–1914* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1972), 25.

not merely an obstacle for British commerce to overcome, but rather a far-flung empire whose strategic and commercial interests clashed with those of Britain. For this reason, British policy makers were compelled to confront and engage with Spanish commercial ideas in the late eighteenth century. This episode suggests the overall softening of the anti-Spanish attitude in Britain. One of the most significant exponents of the new view was William Robertson, Royal Historiographer of Scotland and Principal of Edinburgh University, whose *History of America* appeared in 1777 and re-interpreted the history of the Spanish empire in light of the reforms undertaken by Charles III.

In the *History of America*'s preface, written two years before Spain's intervention in the American Revolution, William Robertson (1721–1793) displayed a preoccupation with the Spanish Empire. While bemoaning Spain's 'impolitic' and 'illiberal' concealment of 'her transactions in America', he strikingly noted he was 'satisfied' that the national 'conduct of [Spain] will be placed in a more favorable light', by divorcing it from the 'reprehensible actions of individuals' and devoted the *History* to this pursuit.[41]

The first three books of his *History* adhere closely to his exculpatory design through two mechanisms. First, Robertson conflated the conquest of the New World with the 'extraordinary' extension of 'the boundaries of human knowledge' and aggrandizement of the 'spirit of discovery'. Although he recognized Spain's 'rapacious and impatient' pursuit of gold underpinned 'the utter extinction of the ancient inhabitants' of the New World and remained unimpressed by Spanish subjugation of those 'naked savages', he unequivocally praised the 'wonderful spirit of enterprise' whose 'ardour' and 'vigour' inexorably propelled them to 'uncommon efforts' of discovery and conquest. Robertson undermined his own rebukes by juxtaposing the 'science, courage and discipline' of the Spaniards and the 'ignorance, timidity, and disorder' of the indigenous population.[42] Second, Robertson emphasized the Spanish Crown's inability to intercede and prevent the destruction of the New World due to its distance from Europe and reproached the moral decrepitude of the first settlers, many of whom were former prisoners. Because 'industry, sobriety, and patience are indispensably requisite of an infant settlement', Robertson argued, 'the vices of those unsound and uncurable members' would produce 'violent and unhappy effects'.[43] Historical inevitability, the violent clash of cultures,

41 William Robertson, *The History of America*, 6th ed., 3 vols (London, 1792 [1st ed. 1777]), I, Preface, v, x.

42 Robertson, *History*, I, Book 2, 158, 210, 229; Book 3, 253–54, 277, 253.

43 Robertson, *History*, I, Book 2, 193; Daniele Francesconi has attempted to establish Robertson's relation to the theory of unintended consequences, arguing the ' "private vices" of the conquistadors and self-serving policy of the Spanish Crown did not usher any "public benefit" ', in 'William Robertson on Historical Causation and Unintended Consequences', *Storia della Storiografia*, XXXVI (1999), 55–80 (p. 79).

and the moral defects of individual agents collectively informed Robertson's defence of the early stages of the Spanish Empire.

Modifying his strategy in the last five books of the *History*, Robertson delineated a rigid boundary separating metropolitan Spain's benign intent and the 'destructive rapacity [of] private adventurers'. By asserting that Spain 'contributed nothing' to the 'rapid and extensive' conquest in terms of 'regular exertion of national force', Robertson derogated the 'rude conquerors' and lambasted their abuses without implicating the monarchy. Most radically, Robertson claimed Spain always had pursued a magnanimous policy, but 'the distance of America from the seat of empire, the feebleness of government in the new colonies, the avarice and audacity of soldiers unaccustomed to restraint prevented these salutary regulations from operating with any considerable influence'. Employing this image of Spanish inefficacy, Robertson pre-empted the deep-seated charge, emanating from the ubiquitous Black Legend, that it pursued an 'execrable scheme' of genocide in the New World. The distance alibi also extricated Spain from its historical failure to increase population, advance commerce, and promote agriculture in America. These shortcomings 'ought to be imputed wholly' to the 'unprincipled adventurers' who 'counteracted the edicts of their sovereign, and have brought disgrace upon their country'.[44]

In the eighth book of the *History*, Robertson traced the economic progress of the Spanish colonies. Although he frequently cited, and quoted liberally from, Adam Smith's arguments, Robertson defended the early monopolist and bullionist policies of Spain as 'natural, and perhaps necessary'. Spain's pioneering efforts as a colonial power rendered excusable its early missteps. He leniently forgave the lust for 'immediate wealth' and lauded the commercial monopoly that fastened Spain's colonies in a condition of 'perpetual pupillage' and maintained 'the supremacy of the parent state' for 250 years. Robertson derided the 'pernicious effects' of the *encomienda* system of property distribution on population growth and industry, postulating that 'property in land ought to be divided into small shares, and the alienation of it should be extremely easy', but emphasized that this arrangement predated Spanish control. As a final resort, Robertson invoked environmental explanations, attributing slow economic growth to 'the diseases of unwholesome climates' and the burden of 'bringing a country, covered with forests, into culture'.[45]

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44 Robertson, *History*, III, Book 6, 98, 99, 100; Book 8, 256, 288, 255, 287, 257. Robertson's description of this process resembles his description of feudalism in 'A View of the Progress of Society in Europe' which served as the preface to *Charles V*: 'if men do not enjoy the protection of regular government, together with the expectation of personal security, they never attempt to make progress in science, nor aim at attaining refinement in taste, or in manners', in *A View of the Progress of Society in Europe, from the Subversion of the Roman Empire, to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1792), 21.

45 Robertson, *History*, III, Book 8, 270–75; according to David Brading, Robertson 'fixed upon the wealth of the church [and] the excessive number of clergy' among the reasons

Robertson criticized the persistence of these features of Spanish colonialism because they detracted from 'the sober, persevering spirit of industry' that leads 'more slowly but with greater certainty, to wealth and increase in national strength'. Although he admonished Spain's colonial monopoly, he underhandedly praised it for resisting the formation of an exclusive trading company, like Britain's East India Company, whose interest 'must in every point be diametrically opposite' from that of the colony. Robertson concluded his narrative with a vindication of the Bourbon economic reforms inspired by 'sentiments more liberal and enlarged'.[46] Robertson argued that both foreign and Iberian 'enlightened writers' revealed the 'destructive tendency of those narrow maxims' that had 'cramped commerce in all its operations'. He lauded Charles III for repudiating 'narrow prejudices', embracing limited free and 'reciprocal intercourse', and overseeing an 'arduous' effort to 'revive the spirit of industry where it has declined'. Simultaneously, however, he argued that Spain's 'internal policy and taxation' required drastic reform 'before industry and manufactures can recover their extensive activity'.[47]

Although there is nothing innovative in these policy prescriptions, they suggest Robertson's reliance on Spanish enlightenment thinkers discussed previously in this chapter, particularly Uztáriz, whose works he listed in the bibliography appended to the *History*. Robertson's lavish support for Spain's economic reforms grew from his conviction that its new economic precepts, sharpened by Smithian insights, animated its reinvigorated colonial commerce. Robertson's contemporary critics, however, viewed Spain more harshly and scrutinized Robertson's praise. They negotiated his 'elogiums' of its recent reforms with unconcealed scepticism, insinuating that this 'affords an obvious reason why this work has been read with approbation in Spain'. Reviewers accused Robertson of 'labouring to palliate enormous crimes' and to 'hide the atrocious deeds of Spain under a pomp of unmeaning words'.[48] Their severe judgment repeated the criticisms of Spain offered by Abbé Raynal in 1770, whose work was widely-disseminated in Britain and offered a counter-point to Robertson's apology for Spanish imperialism.

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for the lack of development in Spanish America, in *The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots and the Liberal State 1492–1867* (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1991), 440.

46 Robertson, *History*, III, Book 8, 303, 314, 320, 337.

47 *Ibid.*, 343, 349, 350.

48 *Annual Register* (1777), 218; *Monthly Review* (1777), 140; *Gentleman's Magazine* (1777), 81; *Critical Review* (1777), 116; *Gentleman's Magazine* (1778), 12; even Dugald Stewart, Robertson's stalwart supporter, was forced to admit, thirty-four years after the initial publication of the *History of America*, that Robertson's 'disposition' to 'palliate or veil the enormities' of the Spaniards was a 'blemish of a deeper or more serious nature' (*Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith L.L.D., William Robertson D.D. and Thomas Reid D.D., Read before the Royal Society of Edinburgh* [Edinburgh, 1811], 242).

In spite of the superficially similar theme and scope of Abbé Raynal's *Histoire des Deux Indes* and Robertson's *History*, they delivered clashing judgments of Spanish imperialism. Like the eighteenth-century British public, Robertson was acquainted with Raynal (1713–1796), confessing that he was 'indebted to an author, whose ingenuity has illustrated, and whose eloquence has adorned' the *Histoire*.[49] Raynal unequivocally condemned the Spanish Monarchy for its complicity in the devastation of the New World. He pursued his indictment through three channels: first, Raynal denied that the unsavoury character of the original Spanish inhabitants mitigated the Crown's responsibility because proper regulation would have produced a benign outcome. 'Rigid laws and equitable administration, an easy subsistence, and useful labour soon infuse morals', Raynal argued, into the former 'scum of the nation'. Although he endorsed rehabilitation, Raynal ambivalently lamented the 'banditti' whose 'alloy debased the first colonies'.[50] Second, Raynal maligned the 'regular and constant system of oppression [that] succeeded to the tumults and storms of conquest' whereas Robertson dissociated an epoch of unbridled rapacity of the conquest from the subsequent period of serene, enlightened government. Third, Raynal blamed the former condition of Spanish national character, imbued with 'prejudice' and 'pride', for hastening the 'perversion of human reason' and claimed Creoles had inherited the 'barbarous luxury, shameful pleasures, romantic intrigues', and 'superstition' of peninsular Spaniards. Furthermore, Raynal linked Spain's 'blind fanaticism' and 'absolute contempt for improvements and customs' with its 'visible decay' into 'inaction and barbarism'.[51]

Robertson and Raynal concurred, however, on three crucial economic topics related to Spain. First, both adamantly rejected 'shining and fatal metals' as a source of national wealth. Second, Raynal's attack on 'rich and indolent proprietors' as the source of the 'perdition and dissolution of

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49 William Robertson, *An Historical Disquisition Concerning the Knowledge which the Ancients Had of India* (London, 1791), 173; Raynal was read avidly in Great Britain: see Dallas D. Irving, 'The Abbé Raynal and British Humanitarianism', *Journal of Modern History*, III (1931), 564–77; furthermore, records from the Bristol Library between 1773–1784 reveal 173 loans of Raynal's *Histoire* (in both French and English), according to P. J. Marshall and Glyndwr Williams, *The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1982), 57.

50 Abbé Guillaume-Thomas François Raynal, *A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies*, trans. J. O. Justamond. 3rd ed., 4 vols (Dublin, 1779), I, Book 2; II, Book 9, 537; II, Book 6, 167; Justamond completed the English translation of the 12th French edition in 1776. His translation was reviewed favourably in the British press for its accuracy and elegance. On Justamond, see Anthony Strugnell, 'La Réception de *L'Histoire des Deux Indes* en Angleterre au dix-huitième siècle', in Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink and Manfred Tietz, *Lectures de Raynal: L'Histoire des deux Indes en Europe et en Amérique au XVIII siècle* (Oxford: Oxford U. P., 1991), 256–58.

51 Raynal, *Histoire*, II, Book 6, 150, 183, 202; II, Book 8, 428–34 passim, 449.

society' recalls Robertson's criticism of the detrimental effects of disproportionate ownership of landed property. Similarly, Raynal's denigration of land distribution policies that cause 'colonists [to be] separated by deserts of several hundred leagues' and preclude compact, 'well-regulated society' resembles Robertson's enumeration of the preconditions of civil society. Raynal's theory of population growth, as noted earlier in this article, 'depends in great measure on the distribution of landed property'. Third, and most importantly, Raynal urged governments to relinquish colonial monopoly and remove 'every obstacle […] that intercepts a direct communication' between the Americas and all European states.

At his core, however, Raynal remained a staunch physiocrat: 'everything depends on, and arises from the cultivation of land', Raynal asserted, 'it forms the internal strength of states; and occasions riches to circulate into them from without' and he de-emphasized the necessity of a robust manufacturing sector.[52] The world historical purpose of commerce, then, ultimately distinguished Raynal from Robertson. Although he lauded commerce's role in the dissolution of feudalism, Robertson remained infatuated with a static world picture, composed of liberal empires of trade. Contrapuntally, Raynal depicted free commerce relentlessly corroding the fences of colonial fiefdoms until it produced a universal society without national boundaries. For Robertson, Spain's reforms adequately addressed its prior imperial problems whereas Raynal depicted Spain's reorganization as a belated reaction to the inevitable transformation catalyzed by commerce.

Yet the image of the Spanish empire was not only important in the intellectual debates discussed up to this point, but also in the practical considerations involving the administration of Britain's empire. The case of Florida illustrates the importance of Spain's empire in British public debate. The surprise capture of Havana in 1762 had been among Britain's highlights in the Seven Years War, a devastating revelation of Spain's maritime weakness and Britain's naval supremacy. Many spectators, however, envisaged its retention as a potential financial burden with distressingly few remunerative prospects: while conceding that 'Florida is not equivalent to it', these pessimists admitted that 'unless we applied ourselves to the cultivation of the country, it would no more have paid the expence of keeping it than Minorca […] [and] we should not have been allowed to have traded with the Spanish West Indies, and so should have missed our imaginary gains'.[53] Britain's acquisition of Florida from Spain

52 Raynal, *Histoire*, II, Book 6, 222 and Book 8, 424; II, Book 7, 305; III, Book 16, 114; IV, Book 19, 513; III, Book 14, 560; II, Book 8, 468–69; IV, Book 19, 493; and II, Book 8, 458.

53 Anon., *Thoughts on Trade in General, Our West Indian in Particular, Our Continental Colonies, Canada, Guadaloupe, and the Preliminary Articles of the Peace Addressed to the Community* (London, 1763), 74.

in the peace settlement of 1763, moreover, devalued Cuba 'for, besides Pensacola, there are other convenient harbours upon that coast where ships of war may be stationed, and under whose eye every vessel from Vera Cruz must pass before she can arrive at Havannah, or proceed on her voyage to Old Spain'.[54] Florida's superiority, however, was not the consensus choice and certain observers mocked the decision to take 'from Spain the territory of Florida, an object of no real value except to show our disposition to be quite equal at least towards' Spain and France. They predicted the Floridas would 'scarce afford matter of revenue either at home or abroad, sufficient to defray the expence of their establishment; not one shilling toward the reduction of our debt'.[55] Without government subsidies, James Grant, East Florida's first governor, argued that 'Florida would be considered as an inadequate equivalent for Havana and remain that barren broken land which it has been erroneously deemed by the uninformed publick'.[56]

Before his appointment as first governor of British West Florida, George Johnstone (1730–1787) had led a checkered naval career. The stigma of an early court martial was removed in 1761 when he rushed to inform Britain's Caribbean fleet that Spain had declared war before this information reached the Spanish dominions, facilitating the pre-emptive siege of Havana. After his four-year stint in Florida, Johnstone commenced a parliamentary career, punctuated by further naval service in the South Atlantic and his appointment to the Carlisle Commission sent to negotiate with the American rebels in 1778.

While lobbying for a gubernatorial appointment in 1763, Johnstone conveyed his exposure to population debates, contending that 'the very test of a goodness of a society may be determined by the number of its inhabitants […] if they do continue to multiply we may pronounce the

54 Anon., *The Present State of the Nation: particularly with Respect to its Trade, Finances & c. & c.* (London, 1768), 21; according to Robert Gold, Spain lost one-fifth of its naval fleet in the defence of Havana. See his *Borderland Empires in Transition: The Triple-Nation Transfer of Florida* (London: Feffer & Simons, 1969), 14; Britain, however, also suffered major casualties, losing one-third of its invasion manpower to disease. See Jeremy Black, *Eighteenth-century Britain 1688–1783* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 278.

55 Anon., *Observations on a Late State of the Nation* (London, 1769), 28–29. See also C. L. Mowat, *East Florida as a British Province, 1763–1784* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1943), 6; land speculators did not view East Florida as a 'barren broken land': the Privy Council made 227 grants in East Florida in the 1760s as opposed to 41 in West Florida and 82 in Nova Scotia. See Bailyn, *Voyages*, 440, 471.

56 Governor James Grant to the Earl of Halifax, September 1763, C.O. 5/540, fols 16–17; Grant (1720–1806) distinguished himself in the Seven Years War and served as governor from 1763–1773. He was later elected as a Minister of Parliament; Robin F. A. Fabel, *The Economy of British West Florida, 1763–1783* (London/Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1988); Harlow, *Founding*, I, 172; Cecil Johnson, *British West Florida 1763–1783* (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1943), 221; see also, C. N. Howard, *The British Development of West Florida 1763–1769* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1947); J. F. Bannon, *The Spanish Borderlands Frontier 1513–1821* (New York/London: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), 191.

institutions good in that proportion in which the people increase'.[57] Johnstone employed the language of improvement, indicating that it had become, to borrow Richard Drayton's phrase, 'a new criterion for responsible authority, and a mission towards which government might legitimately expand its powers'.[58] Johnstone attributed his own futility in encouraging population to 'the total want of money, either for negotiating or supporting them […] has been a great cause why more of them have not come here'. Johnstone described this paucity of money as a 'cruel disadvantage' and a 'deplorable situation', predicting that if trade with Spanish colonies were permitted Florida 'should have dollars as plenty as half-pence in London'.[59]

Had George Johnstone's innate recalcitrance not interceded, his instructions from the Board of Trade would have foreclosed West Florida's prospective trade with the Spanish colonies. In its first communication to Johnstone after his appointment, the Board warned, 'upon pain of our highest displeasure, [do not] give your assent to any law or laws for setting up any manufactures, and carrying on any trades which are hurtful and prejudicial to this kingdom, and that you use your utmost endeavours to discourage, discountenance and restrain [such] attempts'. The Board evidently conceived of West Florida as an agricultural colony and, moreover, sought to avoid arousing Spain's suspicion that Britain's settlement policy was a prelude to the erection of military fortifications from which to attack Spanish territory.[60]

Less than a year later, Johnstone discarded this order and petitioned for permission to encourage Spanish merchant vessels to enter Pensacola, an action which had been dutifully disrupted by the Royal Navy's enforcement of the Navigation Act. Johnstone claimed 'the Spaniards have no commodity in this part of the world which can interfere with our manufactures or the good of our commerce. The introduction of silver has always been encouraged since I knew the West Indies' and he protested

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57 Johnstone to John Pownall, 27 July 1763, C.O. 5/574, fols 1–2; although Johnstone's views on most issues changed often, his ideas concerning population remained firm: in a speech against deploying Hanoverian troops in the American Revolution, Johnstone asserted that 'every country under a good government will breed up to the numbers wanted and the means of subsistence. If population falls off, there is some radical defect—I perceive that some gentlemen seem to laugh at this doctrine—I laugh at their ignorance!' (*Parliamentary History*, XVIII [1775], 822).

58 James Grant to John Pownall, 30 July 1763, C.O. 5/540, fol. 1; Drayton, *Nature's Government*, 89.

59 Johnstone to the Board of Trade, 17 June 1765, C.O. 5/574, fol. 393; Johnstone to the Board of Trade, [?] February 1765, C.O. 5/574, fol. 239; other writers concurred with Johnstone's assessment: 'the hopes of a Spanish trade induced many people to settle here, at a great expense, but it did not answer their expectation'. See Thomas Hutchins, *An Historical Narrative and Topographical Description of Louisiana and West Florida* (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida, 1968 [1st ed. 1784]), 77.

60 Board of Trade to George Johnstone, 3 November 1763, C.O. 5/599, fol. 81.

against the 'sudden unreasonable turn' and 'convulsion'. He prophesied that he could 'easily foresee that our infant colony must be crushed under such an indiscriminate execution of the Law'. Johnstone's predilection for exaggeration was consistent with post-1763 optimistic assessments for Anglo-Spanish inter-colonial commerce: the seizure of prodigious amounts of bullion in Havana and Manila in 1762 and lucrative commerce with Cuba during the eleven-month British occupation caused many observers, discussed earlier in this section, to consider Florida as the El Dorado of contraband.[61]

In many respects, Johnstone's attempts to develop West Florida were hampered by the vigilant enforcement of the Navigation Act. The Royal Navy's seizure of ships suspected of contraband was part of Grenville's broader reform of colonial customs in 1763–64.[62] Johnstone insisted that one of the 'only circumstances wanting to compleat the prosperity of the colony' was 'some clear intelligent instructions to His Majesty's ships for permitting the commerce of the Spanish vessels who may bring bullion or other such merchandises as cannot interfere with our commodities'. Johnstone was trying to exploit divided opinion in the Navy itself on this subject,[63] but he appealed to loftier principles, arguing that trade with Spanish colonies and agricultural improvement were not mutually exclusive goals:

> Commerce must give value to the lands and not that the produce of the lands will be able to establish commerce. They will follow each other. Situated as this colony is, nothing but downright folly can prevent a very extensive commerce. The most material must be that of the Spanish trade. Contiguous to Mexico, La Vera Cruz, Campeachy, Havannah and New Orleans, is it possible to prevent riches from flowing into West Florida now that New Orleans is to be ceded and not a power to rival us in the Bay of Mexico?[64]

Johnstone's arguments for freer inter-colonial trade assumed Britain's trade superiority and resemble Thomas Pownall's propositions for fostering the dependence of foreign colonies on Britain: 'as to the Spanish trade

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61 Johnstone to the Board of Trade, 25 September 1764, C.O. 5/574, fol. 52; see also Johnson, *British West Florida*, 43; Christelow, 'Contraband Trade', 314.

62 Frances Armytage, *The Free Port System in the British West Indies: A Study in Commercial Policy. 1766–1822* (London/New York: Longman, Green & Co., 1953), 24.

63 According to N. R. Stout, Captain Sir John Lindsay, naval commander at Pensacola, urged Admiral Sir William Burnaby to allow Spanish ships into Florida, but this suggestion met with fierce opposition and the seizures continued; nevertheless, the volume of such trade should not be exaggerated—as Stout's research reveals, the logs of naval ships stationed south of Maryland indicate very few seizures. See Stout, *The Royal Navy in America, 1760–1775: A Study in the Enforcement of British Colonial Policy in the Era of the American Revolution* (Annapolis: Naval Academy, 1973), 87, 78.

64 Johnstone to the Board of Trade, C.O. 5/574, fol. 117.

nothing can enable that commerce to flourish but a free egress and regress where the ships bring bullion or such things as do not interfere with our manufactures and take our commodities in return'.[65] But Johnstone's quixotic vision, though thwarted by the Board's neglect and his self-defeating conduct, merits attention because he scorned the orthodox view that colonial trade and manufacturing should be inhibited. His bluntly-stated and unelaborated policy goals curiously blend a fondness for piracy, oceanic commerce, and crude formulations of enlightened administrative ideas: 'nature seems to have intended to place the seat of commerce on [Pensacola] Bay, within a few days sail of the richest cities in the world', Johnstone boasted and he invoked quasi-historical arguments to bolster his claim:

> It has been remarked in all ages that cities never flourished from the natural fertility alone of the soil upon which they stood; it is commerce only that gathers together those great societies that constitute towns; it was thro' it anciently, Tyre, Sidon, Carthage, and Palmyra rose, tho' built in deserts and on sand; and in modern times we find that their unhospitable and barren situations have not hindered this, Amsterdam, Venice, and Genoa from being great and populous […] Whether we regard the situation or the climate, West Florida bids fair to be the Emporium as well as the most pleasant part of the New World.[66]

Johnstone's intellectual hodge-podge mangled tenets of the population and colonial commerce debates. It shows, however, how debates concerning inter-colonial commerce, population and Spanish imperialism manifested themselves on the frontier. Evidently interpreting the Humean link of commerce and population too literally, Johnstone suggested that West Florida's initial population jump could be attributed to the allure of Spanish commerce: 'everybody crowded here at the beginning in hopes of a commerce with them […] Above two hundred people have left this country, who had come in hopes of that correspondence'.[67] Johnstone's request for greater openness with Spanish colonies was rejected: although Spanish vessels 'coming, through distress or for refreshment' should 'receive all necessary assistance', the Board of Trade forbade 'attempts in any manner to bring in any foreign goods and merchandize'.[68] The exigencies of West Florida's predicament rendered this stance unfeasible and Johnstone would impress this point upon his superiors.

Although Johnstone encountered formidable resistance to his commercial schemes with New Spain and Havana, his overtures to

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65 Johnstone, C.O. 5/574, fol.118; see Fabel, *British West Florida* (76–82), for an account of Johnstone's overtures to the Board of Trade concerning Spanish trade.

66 Johnstone to the Board of Trade, 9 November 1764, C.O. 5/574, fols 135–36.

67 Johnstone to the Board of Trade, [?] February 1765, C.O. 5/574, fol. 239.

68 Earl of Halifax to Johnstone, 9 February 1765, C.O. 5/574, fol. 167.

encourage illicit commerce with Spanish-controlled New Orleans found a more sympathetic audience. He argued for its necessity for, 'as yet, we have no saw mills, or labourers or agriculture established among us, neither any other trade […] till the government of the colony is established on a firm foundation'.[69] Unsurprisingly, Johnstone sought to develop trade links with neighbouring Spanish Louisiana, declaring that it was 'such a temptation for smuggling that it is much easier to prevent that practice in every branch by removing the temptations as much as possible than by any coercive means where the risque is so small'.[70] Johnstone also attempted to secure the cooperation of Antonio de Ulloa, the famed explorer, mathematician and political economist who had been appointed Louisiana's governor. 'I am perfectly persuaded', Johnstone wrote to Ulloa in 1766, 'the prosperity of the one colony must draw along with it the prosperity of the other […] enlarged thoughts are far above the little jealousies of commerce, or those national prejudices which have so much disgraced even the ablest politicians in the past […] commerce can hardly be considered in the national view'. British contraband in New Orleans went unabated until the mid-1770s.[71]

After Johnstone's forced resignation from his gubernatorial post in 1766, the image of the Spanish empire continued to appear frequently in his parliamentary speeches and sheds light on two prominent themes of political ideology: first, he remained preoccupied with the boundary separating civil and military power in colonial government and this obsession formed the basis of his larger imperial vision; second, he demonstrated a keen interest in the development of civil society, drawn from Adam Ferguson, and the role of doctrines of improvement in this process. Johnstone's ideas, scattered in pamphlets, official correspondence, and parliamentary speeches display a consistent and coherent position on Spanish affairs, the dangers of military authority, and colonial improvement. Spain served two functions in his later political thought: on

69 Johnstone to the Board of Trade, ? February 1765, C.O. 5/574, fols 239–40.

70 Johnstone to [?], 29 December 1765, C.O. 5/574, fol. 951; by 1777, Johnstone had the audacity to condemn contraband trade encouraged by the British government: 'I freely confess that the impolitic laws of Spain, respecting the commerce of her colonies, is such, by making the temptation of profit so much greater than the risk of seizure, that the adventurous spirit of our countrymen has been frequently called forth to force a trade upon these coasts, and even encouraged by the officers of our government, below the dignity of a great nation', *Parliamentary History*, XIX, 59.

71 Johnstone to Ulloa, 3 May 1766, C.O. 5/575, fols. 25–28; Johnstone made a similar plea in his final existing letter to Ulloa, found at the Archivo General de Indias, Cuba 109, fol. 1343; on Ulloa's tenure as governor, see Miguel Molina, 'El Gobierno de Antonio de Ulloa en Huancavelica y Luisiana', in *Actas del II Centenario de Don Antonio de Ulloa*, ed. M. Losada (Seville: CSIC, 1995); the level of British contraband in Spanish New Orleans should not be underestimated. As J. G. Clark has argued, 'British shipping, credit and merchants monopolized' its economic life. See Clark, *New Orleans 1718–1812: An Economic History* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1970), 182.

the one hand, he portrayed the Spanish empire as a tyrannical power. On the other hand, he was sympathetic to Spain's claims against Britain's empire. In the 1770s during debates on the American revolt, Johnstone invoked Spanish history to defend the colonists' actions. Johnstone implored, 'let us look around, and view the fate of different states that have yielded or preserved the privileges for which the Americans contend. So soon as the *Cortes* lost this power, their slavery was compleat, Portugal now has no vestige of this palladium—Here is tyranny supreme!'.[72] The loss of the *Cortes*, for Johnstone, Spain's representative body, had been the precursor to 'slavery' and 'tyranny supreme'. He defended the colonists 'determined to resist the high doctrines of parliamentary supremacy, held forth by this country, which must, in its consequences, reduce their liberties to a level with the colonies of France and Spain'. The behaviour of the British government, therefore, was slowly coming to resemble its autocratic continental adversaries. In a speech delivered four years later on the deployment of foreign troops in the American Revolution, Johnstone elaborated on the deleterious effects of absolutist government on the individuals inhabiting such a nation. He began by dismissing charges of chauvinism: 'singly and individually, I believe a Frenchman as good as any Englishman, and a Spaniard equal to either, if they are protected by a free government'. He insisted, however, that it was the 'misfortune' of the Spanish, 'having been placed under despotic, they are more fit to destroy, and not so fit to preserve, the privileges of free men'.[73]

Johnstone did not, however, pronounce merely vague and unsubstantiated claims about national character. Seizing upon the historical parallel between the contemporary American revolt and that of the Netherlands, he compared the present-day state of British empire with the apogee of Spanish imperialism under Philip II. Complaining that Britain was 'too conceited to profit from such experience', Johnstone asserted:

> Philip II and his Seventeen Provinces, are the counterpart of what we are acting. The debates in his council on sending the Duke of Alva into the Netherlands, are applicable in every part […] in comparing the probability of events, can any man say Great Britain has such a prospect of victory in the contest as Spain might then have expected? Yet we know the event, and how that mighty empire was rent to pieces.[74]

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72 *Governor Johnstone's Speech on the Question of Recommitting the Address Declaring the Colony of Massachusetts Bay in Rebellion* (London, 1775), 5; it is a reprint of *Parliamentary History*, XVIII (1775), 254–55.

73 Johnstone's speech, *Parliamentary History*, XVIII (1774–1775), 60, 820–21.

74 *Governor Johnstone's Speech*, 13.

Although he had lobbied for access to Spanish-American markets during his stint in West Florida, Johnstone was not among those calling for hostilities with Spain before 1779. He declared that he was 'the furthest of any man in this house from wishing to involve us in a war with Spain'. He also displayed remarkable sympathy for Spanish claims for the return of Gibraltar, deeming it 'the most humiliating circumstance of debilitated empire that has yet appeared in the fluctuating scene of human events'.[75] Moreover, he recognized that Britain could not perpetually irritate Spain, but would have to select its disputes carefully. He favoured 'the commerce of the productive coast of the Mosquito Shore, [as] indefinitely superior to the barren rocks of the Falkland's Island'.[76] Johnstone also attempted to restore Anglo-Spanish peace: in 1780 he travelled to Lisbon to negotiate clandestinely with Spanish ministers and offered Gibraltar in exchange for Spain's exit from the war. In spite of these overtures, Spain remained the model of autocratic and military power for Johnstone, whose ideas indicate the ubiquity and importance of popular perceptions of Spain in Britain in the late eighteenth century.

This article has suggested that the image of Spain was an important aspect of British ideas between 1750 and 1800 and that the image of Spain was shaped both by Spanish imperial reforms and changes within the British Empire.[77] Though Anglo-Spanish cultural links were less robust than those existing between Britain and other continental European nations, Spanish ideas did infiltrate British debates concerning population and colonial commerce. Furthermore, Anglo-Spanish rivalry in North America, particularly on the Caribbean rim, forced British writers and administrators to be aware of the dynamics of Spanish colonialism. In pursuing these themes, this article has sketched the outline of a research agenda that might be useful to both imperial and intellectual historians of eighteenth-century Spain and Britain. First, it would be useful to trace the image of Spain in British thought after 1800, particularly examining the dual impact of Napoleon's conquest of Iberian Spain and the Spanish-American Revolutions on this perception; second, it would be profitable to analyse imperial economic and administrative reform 'above national context', comparing the frameworks employed by Spanish and British political thinkers to devise policy for the colonies in the New World;[78] and

75 Johnstone's speech, *Parliamentary History*, XIX (1777), 65, 64.

76 *Ibid.*, 65.

77 In the process of tracing the image of Spain in a number of British writers for a period of fifty years, I have been conscious of the importance of context and have therefore focused, to borrow Quentin Skinner's phrase, on 'the various agents who used the idea, and on their varying situations and intentions in using it'. See Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', in *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics*, ed. James Tully (Princeton: Princeton U. P., 1988), 56.

78 John Robertson, 'The Enlightenment Above National Context: Political Economy in Eighteenth-century Scotland and Naples', *Historical Journal*, XL (1997), 667–97.

third, it would be fruitful to examine the image of Britain in Spain and to determine the influence of British ideas in the Hispanic World.[79] This article, then, has sought to contribute to an understanding of how British political writers on imperial questions invoked Spain, and how the views expressed by these writers changed in response to Spain's reformation of its empire.

79 Ricardo D. Salvatore, 'The Strength of Markets in Latin America's Socio-Political Discourse, 1750–1850', *Latin American Perspectives*, XXVI (1999), 22–43.