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Enlightened Narratives and Imperial Rivalry in Bourbon Spain: The Case of Almodóvar's *Historia Política de los Establecimientos Ultramarinos de las Naciones Europeas* (1784–1790)

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The link between enlightened historical narratives and imperial rivalry in Bourbon Spain is the subject of this article. The primary focus is the Duke of Almodóvar's translation of the Abbé Raynal's *Histoire Philosophique et Politique des Établissements et du Commerce des Européens dans les Deux Indes* (1770), which bore only slight resemblance to the original in ideology, content, and structure. His five-volume work, which appeared as the *Historia Política de los Establecimientos Ultramarinos de las Naciones Europeas* (*Political History of European Overseas Establishments*), was published in Madrid between 1784 and 1790. It is the most distinguished Iberian contribution to the genre of the enlightened narrative,[1] though it has been neglected by scholars.[2] It provides an appropriate lens through which to observe the transmission, reception, and reconfiguration of foreign ideas in late eighteenth-century Spain.

The reception, translation, and dissemination of works of history, including Almodóvar's *Historia,* in Bourbon Spain were not passive processes. International rivalry provoked patriotic indignation which, in turn, engendered a genre of counterhistorical narrative which endeavored to reprove and contest the unflattering images of Spain promulgated by foreign writers. In addition, I contend, Spanish historians sought to glean practices of rival states which could be used either to vindicate existing policy or to provide support for a policy shift. Almodóvar's *Historia* sought to vindicate Spanish policy from foreign indictment neither by direct confrontation of the charges levied against it by purveyors of the Black Legend nor through effusive praise for Spain's conduct in its Atlantic dominions.[3] Instead, he negatively depicted Spain's rival empires in the New World, especially that of Britain. Almodóvar's purpose, however, was not solely to deflect attention away from the ubiquitous Black Legend, but rather to prod Spain to renovate its empire through the critical emulation of its rivals.

Almodóvar's work is best appreciated against a broader historical panora-

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ma. In the final third of the eighteenth century, Spain's Bourbon monarchs were in the midst of a comprehensive reform of their peninsular kingdoms and overseas empire. The ministers who dominated policy making in the reigns of Charles III (r. 1759–1788) and his son Charles IV (r. 1788–1808) sought to replace the diffuse and unwieldy structures of governance inherited from their Habsburg predecessors. Striving to rejuvenate an imperial bureaucracy centered at Madrid, the Bourbon reformers revamped the state, equipping it with the revenue-generating devices required to restore the monarchy's prestige, to reestablish Spain as a leading force in both Atlantic and Mediterranean politics, and to defend its sovereignty over a scattered and porous empire against the relentless encroachments of non-Spanish commercial agents and predatory rival states.[4]

In pursuing these geopolitical ambitions, Spain accelerated rivalry with other European colonial powers, most notably with Britain. While such renewed competition inevitably would result in military clashes,[5] it also had intellectual repercussions. Politically engaged commentators contributed to heightening interstate rivalry through intellectual production. One of the paradoxes of this interstate conflict, however, was that each nation sought to emulate the most successful practices of its rivals and to adapt them to local conditions. By critically copying its rivals, each state sought to surpass the competition and to dominate international affairs. Although the emulation of successful practices of other states was urged, failed or misguided policies also served as albatrosses, symbols of potential actions whose replication would prove deleterious to the pursuit of geopolitical greatness. Political writers, therefore, dissected, analyzed, and either lauded or repudiated the ideas, institutions, reforms, and character of rival empires.[6] Almodóvar's *Historia,* I argue, epitomizes this broader phenomenon.

I divide this essay into four interlocking sections: first, I explore the function of emulation in late eighteenth-century Europe and demonstrate its connection to international rivalry; second, I suggest how emulation and international rivalry jointly impacted the reception, translation, and production of enlightened historical narratives in Spain; third, I discuss Almodóvar's *Historia* in detail, with a dual focus on his defense of Spain against foreign critics and his call to emulate certain colonial practices of rival states, particularly those of Britain; fourth, I examine one specific British practice, the use of privileged trading companies in colonial trade, and suggest that Almodóvar employed the images of both the East India Company and the Navigation Acts in order to urge the creation of a new, Crown-supported company for the Philippines. Examination of Almodóvar's understudied text, I contend, indicates that imperial rivalry triggered emulation and that the fusion of these forces encouraged the production of "enlightened narratives" in Bourbon Spain.

I. IMPERIAL RIVALRY AND EMULATION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE

Imperial rivalry had major cultural repercussions, including emulation by one state of another's successful practices. The late eighteenth century witnessed a spike in intellectual exchanges and transnational borrowing of practices, a phenomenon due as much to the exigencies of international competition as to cosmopolitanism. Everything, from literary devices to the mechanics of sugar mills, was eligible to be siphoned, borrowed, or adapted. A "spirit of ambitious emulation" was rampant across eighteenth-century Europe.[7] Far from an anachronistic framework imposed by modern scholars, contemporaries were keenly aware of emulation's role in the diffusion of foreign ideas, practices, and institutions and its link to interstate rivalry. Portugal's future enlightened despotic minister, the Marquês de Pombal, observed that "all European nations have improved themselves through reciprocal imitation," adding that "each one carefully keeps watch over the actions taken by the others [and] they take advantage of the utility of foreign inventions."[8] Emulation was a strategy by which a state could modernize its administration, fiscal structures, and military organization in order to compete with its rivals.

Emulation was contrasted with, and seen as the positive counterpart of, jealousy or envy. It was considered to be the competitive pursuit of national excellence. Both emulation and envy were instances of rivalry, but were of "divergent moral quality: one fair and constructive, the other unfair and malevolent."[9] Emulation, in contrast to jealousy and envy, was considered a "generous, ennobling passion, productive of integrity and virtuous ambition."[10]

Emulation and envy often were used as synonyms. Edward Gibbon deployed the composite term "jealous emulation" to encompass its multiple meanings, whereas Adam Ferguson depicted emulation as an "unhappy disposition rarely unmixed with jealousy and envy."[11] It was Adam Smith, however, who defined emulation's relation to statecraft. In *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,* published in 1759, the same year as Charles III's accession to the Spanish throne, Smith contrasted emulation's constructive character with the pernicious effects of jealousy or envy: "the love of our own nation often disposes us to view, with the most malignant jealousy and envy, the prosperity and aggrandisement of any neighboring nation." Smith argued that a nation should endeavor to "promote, instead of obstruct, the excellence of its neighbors. These are all proper objects of national emulation, not of national prejudice or envy."[12] As one recent scholar has powerfully demonstrated, for Smith and his contemporaries, emulation could function as a "vehicle for *grandeza,* a quest for national preeminence"; it became a "patriotic duty, motivated by the love of country and serving national honor."[13]

Emulation was not, of course, an exclusively British concept. In France, the Parisian *Société Libre d'Émulation,* founded in 1776, promoted inventions appli-

cable to agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, justifying its *concours* on the grounds that emulation was a worthy objective. The word "emulation" appears frequently, with positive connotations—for example, in the writings of Helvétius and Mirabeau.[14] In Spain, a high-ranking official reached a similar conclusion concerning the political utility of emulation, arguing that nations whose commerce flourished "emulate that which is most advantageous."[15] A leading writer described fierce competition as a "kind of furore, each nation wanting to raise and enlarge its literary merit over and above the other contestants."[16] An influential political economist urged the creation of learned academies modeled on English and French precedents. These institutions would, he asserted, "enable [Spain] better to imitate the curious inventions of others, and also to make useful discoveries ourselves, of such things that are serviceable to a foreign and home trade."[17] A key minister under Charles III concurred, pleading that "by means of their academies, the empire of the arts has been appropriated, and the rest of the Europe merely copies their inventions." With the establishment of academies, this minister declared, Spain could "reach the same level and, within a few years, overcome its backwardness and regain the time that it has lost."[18] It is in this dual context of geopolitical rivalry and emulation that Almodóvar's *Historia* is best analyzed, a work which sought not merely to refute the Black Legend, but to propose a new direction for Spanish imperial policy.

II. THE PRODUCTION AND RECEPTION OF ENLIGHTENED HISTORICAL NARRATIVES IN BOURBON SPAIN

International rivalry and emulation helped to give rise to the genre of enlightened historical narratives in Bourbon Spain. History furnished policy makers with prescriptive formulae as well as cautionary tales. Historical scholarship also served to legitimize the established political-social order and was a major feature of the cultural landscape, rather than the domain of an insular, university-based elite.[19] In this regard, developments in Spain formed part of a broader trend across Europe. Eighteenth-century historiography was a "world of amateurs and virtuosi, in which established literate elites—churchmen, lawyers, humanists—coexisted and competed with leisured critics and independently operating *philosophes*."[20] In Spain, where history was considered indispensable for politics, debates concerning the historiography of empire attracted the attention of figures at the highest echelons of government.

The historical period which captured the imagination of the Bourbon reformers was Spain's conquest of the New World in the sixteenth century and the subsequent entrenchment of its empire. But Spain's colonization had been pilloried by rival claimants to the imperial mantle. The Dutch depiction of Spanish brutality during their revolt from the Habsburg yoke in the late sixteenth century had been taken up by the English and French in the subsequent

two centuries, giving rise to the ubiquitous Black Legend. Spain was regarded suspiciously by European observers as an aspirant to universal monarchy, a barbarous destroyer of America's indigenous peoples and, to borrow Gibbon's characterization, a nation marked by "gloomy pride, rapacious avarice and unrelenting cruelty."[21] European depictions of Spain invariably made use of the deeply entrenched Black Legend concerning its rapacious conduct in the New World.

Responding to eighteenth-century manifestations of this Black Legend was a major activity undertaken by Spanish historians of the Bourbon era. The descriptions contained in William Robertson's *History of America* (1777) and Raynal's *Histoire* attracted the lion's share of the attention. Almodóvar's work thus formed part of a broader, coordinated effort that sought to vindicate Spain's colonial past and to contest foreign polemics. Foreigners, a leading minister for ultramarine affairs complained, "possessed by emulation and jealousy of our achievements and great aptitude, have endeavoured to tarnish the glories and triumphs of Spain, and, toward this deprived end, have concocted histories based in inaccurate perceptions, in no way justified, and for the most part false."[22] The protracted debate over the introduction into Spain of Robertson's *History* and Raynal's *Histoire* signals history's elevated place in the genesis of Bourbon reform ideology. Foreign intellectual currents neither were received passively nor dismissed as impertinent to statecraft, but rather provoked spirited reactions and revisions that, in turn, produced syncretic ideas with which policy makers galvanized state action.

The Spanish translation of Robertson's *History* was ultimately rejected in the late 1770s after protracted debate.[23] Before Almodóvar undertook his translation of Raynal, another Spanish historian received a royal commission to write a history of the New World which would respond, in a comprehensive and new-fangled way, to foreign derision of Spanish colonialism. Juan Bautista Muñoz (1745–1799), Royal Cosmographer of the Indies, lobbied Charles III to write such a history, claiming that its absence had been "greatly prejudicial to the honor and to the interests of the nation." Foreign writers, he fulminated, with Robertson's and Raynal's accounts foremost in his mind, "unjustly indict the conduct of Spain, deprecate the merit of our discoveries, and obscure the glory of our heroes." Such a history, which Muñoz volunteered to pen, would correct the record, demonstrating "the righteous conduct and good intentions" of the Spanish Crown. He would thus "dissipate the clouds which shroud the truth with ignorance and accusation" and vindicate "the benevolence of the government" in the Americas.[24]

Although the royal permission solicited by Muñoz was granted in 1779, his *Historia del Nuevo Mundo* was published eleven years later. In the introduction to the first and only completed volume, Muñoz argued that Spain had encountered in the New World a "field of glory worthy of its elevated thoughts" and, in spite of obstacles, the "genius along with the ardour of religious belief ensured the happy attainment of its most arduous enterprises." Spain, far

from destroying the New World's wealth, persevered heroically in the worst of conditions, until America's "steadily increasing wealth sparked the emulation, competition, industry, commerce, and interest of all of Europe." Muñoz's bleak account of the pre-*Conquista* New World served to accentuate his claim for Spain's status as the indispensable conduit of European culture, without which the Americas would have remained mired in barbarism.[25]

The first volume of Muñoz's *Historia* had been presented and approved by the Royal Academy of History for publication in 1791. However, in the final general session to approve it, normally a formality, his work was attacked bitterly. His detractors argued that Muñoz's *Historia* was not merely a "modest individual effort," but rather represented a "special responsibility" given by the late Charles III, who had died in 1788. "Announced to both the nation and the rest of Europe" for many years, it must, therefore, be treated as "work of the nation" and judged by a higher standard. The most damaging criticism was that Muñoz's work added "nothing substantial to what has been written by previous historians of the Indies," both foreign and Spanish. Muñoz's history had "omitted to provide many reflections," thus lacking "the philosophy proper to the century" and "required of a history so long anticipated."[26]

Almodóvar headed the academy's commission which approved Muñoz's work and, subsequently, defended him against rearguard attack: "[our committee] has gained much [from reading his work] and we expect the same of the good judgment of the Academy."[27] Almodóvar's opinion was not to be taken lightly: not only was he in line to assume the top post at the Royal Academy, but his five-volume translation of Raynal's history had appeared several years before the appearance of Muñoz's *Historia.* An unfavorable judgment of Spain's colonization of the New World also lay near the heart of Raynal's narrative, the harshness of which Almodóvar contested.

Yet Almodóvar's project differed from previous efforts, including that of Muñoz, which pursued strategies of either debunking the Black Legend or defending Spanish conduct and motives in the New World. Almodóvar shifted the focus away from Spain. Peering beyond the Pyrenees and the Cantabrian Sea, Almodóvar analyzed the imperial trajectories of England, France, Portugal, and Holland, focusing on both efficacious practices as well as failed policies. Combining a cosmopolitan outlook with a ferocious patriotism, Almodóvar's *Historia,* which he published under the pseudonym (and anagram) Eduardo Malo de Luque, strongly insinuated along what lines the Spanish empire should reform in order to compete with rival imperial states.

III. BETWEEN EMULATION AND REPULSION: ALMODÓVAR'S TRANSLATION OF RAYNAL'S *HISTOIRE*

Pedro Francisco Jiménez de Góngora y Luján (1727–1796), later elevated to title of the Duke of Almodóvar, was director of the Royal Academy of History

from 1791 until his death in 1796. Almodóvar was long accustomed to such public power, which followed naturally from his career service as an ambassador to the courts of various European states. Almodóvar's diplomatic career began in 1759 as an envoy to Russia. He remained in St. Petersburg until 1765, when he was named ambassador to Portugal during the age of Pombal. His tenure in Lisbon culminated with the Treaty of San Ildefonso (1778) which ended the numerous squabbles and skirmishes which had plagued Luso-Spanish relations since the Seven Years' War.[28] In 1778, he became ambassador to Britain, though Anglo-Spanish belligerence circumscribed his diplomatic efficacy. These biographical details are important because Almódovar's thirty-five-year diplomatic career is highly relevant to the interpretation of his *Historia* offered in this essay. Containing imperial rivalry and negotiating overseas disputes were key duties in Russia, Portugal, and England. From his diplomatic posts, he corresponded extensively with, and knew intimately, the Madrid-based architects of Bourbon imperial reform.

The imprint of these professional experiences and relationships are discernible in, and pertinent to, the arguments of his *Historia*.[29] In a 1767 letter to Spain's foreign minister, Almodóvar's preoccupation with British expansion is starkly revealed. He warned of the "grave damage which would result from further English establishments" in the Americas. He proposed an alliance of mutual protection with Portugal on the condition that it closed its European and Brazilian ports to British shipping.[30] Almodóvar's suspicion of, and hostility toward, British ultramarine designs—which he claimed, in a 1779 epistle, emerged from a combination of "dark and hidden maxims," "ambition," and "excessive pride"—would become a significant subterranean anxiety of his *Historia* when it was published twenty years later.[31]

Although the exact reasons for Almodóvar's decision to undertake a translation of Raynal (whose work was banned in Spain) remain obscure, his remarks in the *Historia* provide certain clues: in the second volume, Almodóvar lamented that "foreign writers have endeavoured to discredit Spain without having read or examined its long-verified and true histories."[32] Almodóvar presented his project as part of the broader refutation of the Black Legend and the restoration of Spain's international reputation. "Emulation, or better put, jealousy," he wrote, "has produced malignant detractors against the name of Spain."[33] But Almodóvar's project went beyond mere apology and the rejection of Raynal's indictment; instead it sought to show how a revivified empire could enable Spain to further reverse its decline and, ultimately, outstrip its rivals.

Raynal (1713–1796) unequivocally condemned the Spanish monarchy for its complicity in the devastation of the New World. He pursued his indictment through three channels. First, Raynal denied that the unsavory character of the original Spanish inhabitants mitigated the Crown's responsibility because proper regulation would have produced a benign outcome. "Rigid laws and

equitable administration, an easy subsistence, and useful labour soon infuse morals," Raynal argued, into the former "scum of the nation." Although he acknowledged the possibility of rehabilitation, Raynal lamented the "banditti" whose "alloy debased the first colonies."[34] Second, Raynal maligned the "regular and constant system of oppression [that] succeeded to the tumults and storms of conquest," an epoch of unbridled rapacity unleashed by the conquest and unabated to this day.[35] Third, he blamed Spanish national character, imbued with "prejudice" and "pride," for hastening the "perversion of human reason." He claimed that Creoles had inherited the "barbarous luxury, shameful pleasures, romantic intrigues," and "superstition" of peninsular Spaniards.[36]

Raynal linked Spain's "blind fanaticism" and "absolute contempt for improvements and customs" with its "visible decay" into "inaction and barbarism," language which partially accounts for the vigorous censorship which Raynal's *Histoire* suffered in the Spanish world. But Spain's actions in the New World, repeated to varying degrees of rapacity by subsequent European competitors, were detrimental not only to non-European peoples, according to Raynal (and his collaborator Diderot), but to Europeans, whose prospects for stability and freedom were diminished by the persistence of imperial rivalry.[37] Raynal therefore implored all European governments to relinquish colonial monopoly and remove "every obstacle . . . that intercepts a direct communication" between the Americas and all European states. For Raynal, the world historical purpose of commerce was to corrode relentlessly the fences of colonial fiefdoms.[38]

In his response to Raynal's grand narrative, banned in Spain after 1779, Almodóvar did not disguise his partiality: "I am both Catholic and Spanish," he declared, explaining his intention to purge the Abbé's work of its impieties and chauvinism. He insisted that he was not "obliged to translate the original which guides us, but rather its general method, select its seed, and add pertinent information to update the work."[39] In claiming that it was not a strict translation, Almodóvar accurately assessed that his own work for Raynal's *Histoire* served merely as a point of departure for his own vision of the Atlantic world. While the first two volumes of Almodóvar's *Historia* mirror Raynal's design, the Spaniard added a voluminous appendix entitled "The English Constitution and the Affairs of the English East India Company," a feature not found in Raynal's original work. Moreover, in Almodóvar's third volume, he appended a sixty-eight-page essay entitled "The Political and Economic State of France." Whereas both Almodóvar's fourth and Raynal's third volumes, respectively, examine Scandinavian, Prussian, and Russian colonial ventures, Almodóvar supplemented the Frenchman's account with "Analytical Memoirs Relative to the History and Present State of Russia," drawn primarily from materials and recollections of his diplomatic stint in St. Petersburg.

In addition to the three crucial appendices, Almodóvar's *Historia* differs

most starkly from Raynal's in its failure to discuss America. Whereas Raynal's final seven volumes exhaustively treat Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, and English colonial activity in the New World, Almodóvar remained conspicuously silent, concluding his work with a comparatively technical overview of Spanish settlements in Asia, including an extensive treatment of commercial prospects in the Philippines.[40] Almodóvar's strategy avoids directly disputing the assessments of Spanish colonialism purveyed by Raynal. Instead, he utilized contemporary reports of English atrocities in India to undermine the cultural chauvinism that he perceived permeated European accounts of the Spanish Conquest. While conceding the existence of "some avaricious, cruel and misfortunate individuals" among the *Conquistadores,* he insisted that "the times, the circumstances, the distances, the scope" of the colonizing project served as mitigating factors, whereas the English commenced "with the charitable motive of commerce, with the pretext of friendship, with the appearance of a lamb" but later "transformed into a carnivorous wolf."[41] Almodóvar, then, devoted scant attention to Spanish colonial practices and aimed to analyze, and extract useful lessons from, the conduct of rival European imperial powers. In this way, he declined to refute the specific charges of the Black Legend and, instead, analyzed foreign practices in order either to vindicate certain Spanish practices or to urge policy shifts.

Almodóvar's narrative vindicated three Spanish imperial practices. First, he attacked the notion that monarchical form of government caused Spain's seventeenth-century decline or impeded its economic recovery. As a corollary, he sought to dispel the notion that Spanish decline was linked to something intrinsic about its national character. Second, he highlighted the idiosyncrasies, if not depravities, of English and French colonial establishments. Third, he provided an account of colonial commerce that, though drawing selectively on Raynal, favored the expansion of privileged monopoly companies which the Abbé had eschewed.[42]

Almodóvar instructed his readers to inspect the historical trajectories of Holland and Portugal, formerly "tiny crumbs of the great Spanish monarchy." He argued that forms of government and the fortunes of empire had no causal relation: the Portuguese empire "flourished and degenerated under monarchical government" whereas the Dutch Republic had undergone a similar transformation while its form of government remained constant. The underlying cause in both cases, Almodóvar contended, was the relative abundance, or absence, of "great men or great virtue."[43] Employing Portugal repeatedly as a test case, Almodóvar repudiated the notion that Spain's national character precluded the profitable colonization of distant territories. The primary problem encountered by Portugal in its eastward expansion lay, in Almodóvar's view, in its "desire to be a conquering power, to govern extensive territory which no nation would have been capable of conserving without debilitating itself."[44] These two examples indicate Almodóvar's preference for monarchi-

cal institutions and his inclination to attribute geopolitical decline to the inexorable tendencies of imperial overstretch, rather than to the peculiarities of national character or intrinsically defective modes of government.

Almodóvar's circuitous apology for Spain's imperial legacy commenced with a superficially innocuous appraisal of its rivals, particularly Britain. As either "enemy or ally," he insisted, "Great Britain is the power with which our interests are most linked, by very close-knit political and mercantile relations." Almodóvar postulated, however, that Britain never would "rule Europe or the rest of the world," a judgment which probably reflected Britain's humbled international stature after its 1783 capitulation in American Revolution.[45] In an appendix to volume 2, Almodóvar lavished considerable attention on the English East India Company which previously "had conducted itself well relative to other companies, better conserving the customs, discipline and vigor than those of other nations." In Bengal, however, this laudable conduct degenerated and had "altered and corrupted all the sources of confidence and public happiness."[46] He did not refute the Black Legend, but rather tarnished England's reputation for being "so reflexive, philosophical, generous and such a good friend of liberty." England had, according to Almodóvar's account, "stained its glories" by its recent reprehensible conduct in India and demonstrated itself to be "cruel, haughty, avaricious and unjust."[47]

Moreover, Britain's conduct in India, Almodóvar claimed, was unmitigated by the factors which produced Spain's excesses in its sixteenth-century conquest of the Americas. "After the lessons and experiences of three centuries, the advances in the sciences, the arts and politics," he chided—not to mention the "bitter criticisms and absurd calumny levied against Spain"—Britain still engaged in "barbarism."[48] In this way, Almodóvar appropriated the language of the Black Legend, formerly used exclusively to denigrate Spanish colonialism, and imposed it on the British. Unlike Raynal, who believed that parliamentary action could ameliorate the East India Company's conduct, Almodóvar refrained from speculation on this question, preferring to draw attention to Britain's egregious crimes in South Asia. In this way, a type of counter-emulation was urged, in which Britain's imperial excesses were impugned as conduct to be both derided and avoided.

Nevetheless, Almodóvar was not implacably hostile toward Britain. As noted previously, his attitude toward the English constitution remained favorable. Whereas Spain and France were "disconnected pieces linked to one another without mutual adhesion," Almodóvar argued, in England "nothing is divided and, therefore, one senses the immense power of royal authority."[49] Although Almodóvar's treatment of France is less rigorous in the *Historia* than in other works, he identifies mutuality and rivalry as key factors in the imperial policy of England and France who "fear, contemplate, insult, bore and highly estimate one another."[50]

Yet Almodóvar nourished a patriotic aim in his lengthy treatment of France

and England which went beyond disputing the Black Legend and casting aspersions. For him, as for Adam Smith, emulation could be a path to national greatness. Referring to France and England as "masters of the century in which the spirit of moderation reigns, [along with] the good correspondence of humanity and philosophy," he called on other "great nations," transparently his own, to "open their eyes" and "follow the right methods." In such a way, Almodóvar claimed, Spain could sustain its "legitimate and lofty independence and perhaps achieve parity" with France and England.[51] As shall be shown in part 4 of this essay, Almodóvar would argue that Spain should adopt a trading company, on the English East India Company model, for trade with the Philippines, enjoying its economic success while avoiding its disreputable excesses. Through critical emulation, Almodóvar suggested, Spain could further bolster its geopolitical standing.

Almodóvar's *Historia* attracted the attention of the Spanish Enlightenment's leading figures. His approach to Raynal earned both their approbation and dismay. Juan de Sempere y Guarinos summarized the positive evaluation: "he endeavoured its correction, purging it of many defects, adding some useful parts, which both manifest the good judgment of the author and his skill in affairs of state."[52] Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, by contrast, censured the first volume of Almodóvar's work in late 1783, just prior to its publication, noting that it was "unblemished by errors and impieties," but the scrupulousness needed to achieve this result also led Almodóvar to excise many "beautiful discourses" of Raynal's original and the "integrity of the work has been lost, something more essential to a 'philosophical' history."[53] Fidelity to Raynal's text, however, never appears to have been Almodóvar's aspiration. His cosmopolitan outlook was primarily instrumental, an enlightened narrative to vindicate certain Spanish colonial policies and to promote the reform of other practices.

IV. COLONIAL COMMERCE AND THE REVIVAL OF SPAIN IN ALMODÓVAR'S *HISTORIA*

Almodóvar's conception of international and colonial commerce did not strictly mimic Raynal's views. Certain passages of the *Historia* undoubtedly echo the *Histoire*: "war and navigation have mixed the destinies of societies and peoples," Almodóvar declared, and "commerce invites all nations to consider the others as part of a single society, whose members can participate in the goods of all the rest."[54] Other pronouncements, however, suggest economic priorities in the colonial sphere distinct from Raynal's.

Though he "overcame some of the most rigid tenets of mercantilism," one eminent scholar has argued, Almodóvar "maintained greater affinities" with it than with Raynal's nascent liberalism.[55] For example, Almodóvar praised the "fortunate tyrant" Cromwell for his "famous Acts of Navigation [1651] by

which the commerce and marine of England flourishes even today." Privileged companies also were meritorious in Almodóvar's view, especially when their "ancient relations and established credit made them indispensable." He implored the reader, "the man of healthy judgment," not to be seduced by the cries of "*'commercial liberty'* and *'civil liberty.'*" He warned that economic writers purveying such schemes promise advantages which often proved to be nothing but a "chimera."[56] Almodóvar instead advocated the expansion of privileged trade, specifically the creation of a monopoly company for the Philippines as the most effective mode of extracting resources and generating revenue.

Almodóvar's attitudes toward commerce formed part of a broader discourse in the Spanish Empire, where debates concerning free trade and privileged companies were notably boisterous.[57] It is necessary to recall that two great systems of monopoly operated simultaneously in the late eighteenth century: first, the colonial system by which each empire sought to exclude the merchants of all other nations; second, a system of exclusive companies by which imperial states attempted to exclude all merchants other than those of a single, privileged company.[58] From the advent of its dominion in the New World, the Spanish Crown had zealously guarded its American colonies from foreign penetration through the use of both of these systems of monopoly. Until 1720, all merchant ships were compelled to call at Seville, and, between 1720 and 1765, at Cádiz, whose merchants virtually monopolized the American trade. Foreign commercial ships were, legally at least, prohibited from entering Spanish American ports. Furthermore, in an attempt to guarantee markets for Spanish exports, the development of manufactures was strictly forbidden in the colonies. The colonies thus were relegated to a position of producers of raw materials and consumers of otherwise uncompetitive Spanish manufactured goods.

The early eighteenth-century Spanish political economists endorsed both Spain's absolute monopoly and the virtues of privileged trading companies. They attributed Spain's economic stagnation to the composition of its foreign and domestic trade and to its poor shipping facilities, both of which caused otherwise reducible outflows of precious metals. These factors, among others, led Spain to fall behind its imperial rivals. One midcentury Spanish political writer noted "the spirit of commerce has been born and is spreading among the modern nations . . . we sleep while they pass the night in fervent activity."[59] Privileged companies, it was hoped, could help to improve Spain's lagging position, overcome the mercantile superiority of other nations, and foment commerce in less developed parts of the empire where the absence of Spanish trade had engendered rampant contraband.

By the final third of the eighteenth century, Spanish opinion had turned against privileged trading companies. They had failed to lower prices, improve the quality of goods, introduce new methods, and establish a stable

and secure commercial system. Yet the underperformance of the Spanish companies was replicated in its rival states, thus leading many to deride the institution itself. "France committed huge errors when it established its colonies, believing that restrictions, regulations and exclusive companies were necessary for their prosperity," declared one anonymous commentator, and "the French colonies were mired in poverty for more than a century."[60] In his 1794 preface to *The Wealth of Nations,* Adam Smith's Spanish translator mocked Britain for having granted trading companies sovereign power and the right to maintain garrisons and fortifications in overseas dominions.[61] The touted free trade (*comercio libre*) decrees of 1765 and 1778 eliminated some of the regulations constricting Spanish colonial commerce, represented the death knell of existing chartered companies, and appeared to prefigure an embrace of freer oceanic trade.

Reform, however, was not comprehensive: foreign merchants remained legally excluded from Spanish entrepôts and trading companies retained their monopoly in some ultramarine provinces. Where less regulated trade was permitted, it did not prove to be the anticipated remedy for the deep-seated malaise wrought by belated industrialization and colonial undersupply. By the 1780s, the shortcomings of the new, less regulated approach prompted Madrid's policy makers to experiment with combinations of freer trade and privileged companies in the hopes of discovering a formula for lasting prosperity.

Exploiting a political climate favorable to privileged trading companies, Almodóvar proposed the establishment of one for the Philippines which he described as the ideal mechanism to exploit the natural abundance of that archipelago. He insisted that such a company be founded on "true principles," subject to revaluation every twenty-five years to determine whether monopoly privilege should be extended, or should be superseded by a policy predicated on different principles.[62] In a probable allusion to the physiocratic ideas professed by Raynal, he contended that the "most powerful" method to develop the Philippines would be the "cultivation of its extensive lands," a goal best achieved, he maintained, through the formation of a privileged trading company.[63]

Almodóvar's advocacy of a privileged company was not uncontroversial as a strategy for colonial development. Some officials proposed abandoning distant outposts of empire altogether. Even the governor of the Philippines wrote to Charles IV urging that Spain attempt to exchange that far-flung archipelago with Britain for Gibraltar or Jamaica. The Philippines, in his view, were neither "comparable in importance nor in usefulness to augment its power and commerce." Considered together with Bengal, the governor predicted, Britain could create an Asian empire "capable of recovering the decline which it feels in Europe," thus providing Spain with a freer hand in the Americas.[64]

In spite of such weighty reservations, the Royal Philippines Company,

which was empowered to conduct trade between Manila and the rest of Spain's empire, as well as exclusive right to import slaves into Venezuela, received a royal charter in March 1785. Like the scheme Almodóvar had envisaged, the company received a twenty-five-year charter and a capitalization of eight million pesos, of which the Crown purchased one million, thus demonstrating its backing of, and confidence in, the venture.[65] Proponents of the company predicted that the archipelago was destined to become the "emporium of Asian commerce," aiding Spain's balance of trade by substituting Asian products for those currently received from France, Germany, and Switzerland. The company also would become the exclusive supplier of African slaves in Spanish America. Supporters argued that the merchant marine would flourish, paving the way for the traffic of African slaves, thus reducing dependence on European suppliers.[66] Since the company was formed out of the remnants, and took over the functions of the defunct Caracas Company, it was granted the right to carry forty percent of Spain's exchange with Caracas (modern Venezuela) as well, effectively excluding the colony from the *comercio libre* regime operating in the rest of the Caribbean until 1789.

In that year, as a result of shifting ideology combined with the company's failure to deter contraband and to introduce slaves in sufficient quantities, the clause guaranteeing the company's share in Caracas was rescinded and its total annual commerce rapidly plunged, accounting for a mere five percent of the total by 1795, the year preceding Almodóvar's death.[67] Renewed Anglo-Spanish belligerence further disrupted Spain's transoceanic trading system and hastened Spanish America's ultimate rupture, after 1808, with the peninsula. These events, however, should not obscure the fact that Almodóvar's call for the emulation of a British institution was heeded and, perhaps imperfectly, realized.

V. CONCLUSION

Almodóvar's *Historia* is perplexing on at least two levels: first, the unabashed infidelity to Raynal's text begs the question of his insistence on the work's status as a translation; and second, given that Raynal's original was banned in Bourbon Spain, it is perplexing that a powerful public official undertook the risky endeavor of translating this forbidden best seller in the first place and, subsequently, of publishing it under a pseudonym. These enigmas shall remain unsolved unless new documentary evidence comes to light.

What is less confounding, and perhaps more provocative, is the part played by Almodóvar and other historians of Bourbon Spain in fomenting imperial rivalry as well as geopolitical rivalry's spur to major historical production. Far from a banal process of passive reception, dull translation, and desultory dissemination, an analysis of Almodóvar's five-volume treatise urges at least two conclusions. First, historical translation was a politically charged process of

omission and replacement, a process in which emulation was a crucial force. Second, Almodóvar's *Historia* demonstrates the Spanish Enlightenment's critical engagement with, and intellectual appetite for, the political practices of other European states, especially the administration of their overseas possessions. This engagement served not merely to refute the Black Legend and to compare Spain's conduct favorably with the imperial experiences of rival imperial states. Almodóvar's *Historia* highlights the mechanisms through which European ideas, particularly historical tracts, were incorporated into Bourbon political discourse and applied to contemporary policy decisions confronting the Spanish Empire.[68] The traces of critical emulation found in Almodóvar's work provides further evidence that the Spanish Enlightenment was not a derivative affair, a pale shadow of developments in France and Britain, but rather was characterized by intellectual cross-pollination, a cosmopolitanism tempered by patriotic duty and religious piety, and a conviction that history might furnish contemporaries with the insights required to propel Spain to recover its diminished geopolitical *grandeza.*

Stanley and Barbara Stein argued that "neither political economists nor Bourbon administrators were innovators. They emphasized tradition, continuity and circumspection."[69] On the one hand, Almodóvar's *Historia* seems to confirm this hypothesis and extend it to historical writing. On the other hand, a careful reading of his narrative suggests how innovative policy suggestions emanate from a historical text which professes to operate faithfully within the confines of national and religious tradition. Grappling with this understudied text, and the robust spirit of critical emulation with which it is imbued, may help to clarify the mechanisms by which ideas were transmitted between cultures, among rival states, and across intellectual boundaries in the long eighteenth century.

NOTES

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1. Enlightened narratives, according to J. G. A. Pocock, are histories that conflate narratives of "state formation and the civilization of commerce which combine to produce philosophical history"; see *Barbarism and Religion, Volume II: Narratives of Civil Government* (Cambridge, 1999), 20–21.

2. Almodóvar has not, of course, been entirely neglected. See Ovidio García Regueiro's excellent *Ilustración e Intereses Estamentales: Antagonismo entre Sociedad Tradicional y Corrientes Innovadoras en la Versión Española de la* Historia *de Raynal* (Madrid, 1982).

3. On the Black Legend, see J. H. Elliott, *The Old World and the New 1492–1650* (Cambridge, 1970), 94–97; Ricardo García Cárcel, *La Leyenda Negra: Historia y Opinión* (Madrid, 1992); Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–1800* (New Haven, 1995), 87, 116; and Benjamin Keen, "The Black Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities," *Essays in the Intellectual History of Colonial Latin America* (Boulder, 1998), 70–86. On the Spanish refutation of the Black Legend in the eighteenth century, see P. J. Hauben, "White Legend Against Black: Nationalism and Enlightenment in a Spanish Context," *The Americas* 34 (1977): 1–19; and Javier Yagüe Bosch, "Defensa de España y Conquista de América en el Siglo XVIII: Cadalso y Forner" *Dieciocho* 28 (2005): 121–40.

4. For classic studies of the Bourbon reform period, see Richard Herr, *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain* (Princeton, 1958); D. A. Brading, "Bourbon Spain and its American Empire," *The Cambridge History of Latin America* (Cambridge, 1984); John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain 1700–1808* (Oxford, 1989); and Stanley and Barbara Stein, *Apogee of Empire: Spain and New Spain in the Age of Charles III, 1759–1789* (Baltimore and London, 2003). For a review of the most recent historiography of Bourbon Spain, see Gabriel Paquette, "Empire, Enlightenment and Regalism: New Directions in Eighteenth-Century Spanish History," *European History Quarterly* 35 no. 1 (2005): 107–17.

5. The conflicts, of varying degrees of intensity, ranged from full-fledged war during the Seven Years' War, clashes over the Falkland Islands, contention over British smuggling in the Caribbean and logwood operations on the Mosquito Coast, Spanish involvement in the American War of Independence, and wrangling over the Nootka Sound. Relations with France, of course, were mainly cordial due to the successive Family Compacts. For an excellent overview of Anglo-Bourbon rivalry, see H. M. Scott, *The Birth of a Great Power System 1740–1815* (Harlow, 2006), esp. ch. 8, "The Anglo-Bourbon Struggle Overseas and in Europe, 1763–1788," 214–43.

6. This phenomenon was not unique to Spain. For French observers, the Spanish monarchy served as an example of financial and colonial mismanagement. See Paul Cheney, "Finances, Philosophical History and the 'Empire of Climate': Enlightenment Historiography and Political Economy," *Historical Reflections* 31 (2005), 141–67, esp. 148–54.

7. J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture* (London, 1980), 187.

8. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo [later Pombal], *Escritos Económicos de Londres (1741–1742),* ed. José Barreto (Lisbon, 1986), 158; also quoted in Kenneth Maxwell's seminal article "Pombal and the Nationalization of the Luso-Brazilian Economy," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 48 no. 4 (1968): 608–31, 608. Such observations corroborate C. A. Bayly's recent thesis that modernity is a "process of emulation and borrowing" (*The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* [Oxford, 2004], 10).

9. Istvan Hont, *Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 115–17.

10. John Iverson, "Introduction: Forum on Emulation in France, 1750–1800" *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 36 no. 2 (2003): 217–23, 218.

11. Quoted in Hont, 118 and 122; Richard Drayton provides further evidence of this phenomenon and suggests how English officials "came to imitate the styles of government, copy the institutions and respond to the ideologies of their [continental] contemporaries" in *Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain and the "Improvement" of the World* (New Haven and London, 2000), 68.

12. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* [1759] (Amherst, N.Y., 2000), pt. 6, sect. 2, ch. 2, 335–36.

13. Hont, 120–21.

14. John Shovlin, "Emulation in Eighteenth-Century French Economic Thought," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 36 no. 2 (2003): 224–30, 226.

15. B[iblioteca de] P[alacio] R[eal] (Madrid) II/2829, Marqués de Llanos, "Los Medios con que Puede Conseguir la Felicidad de la Monarquía" (1755), fo. 102v. Please note: subsequent references to this archive will be noted as B. P. R.

16. Juan Pablo Forner, *Oración Apologética por la España y Su Mérito Literario* (Badajoz, 1788), 19.

17. Jerónimo de Uztáriz, *The Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs* (London, 1751), 2:423. The impact of Colbert and other French mercantilist writers in Spain is treated in Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore and London, 2000) and, more recently, *Apogee of Empire.*

18. Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, *Discurso Sobre la Educación Popular de los Artesanos y su Fomento* (Madrid, 1775), 79.

19. María Teresa Nava Rodríguez, "Reformismo Ilustrado y Americanismo: La Real Academia de la Historia, 1735–1792" (Ph.D. dissertation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1989), 683; Nava Rodríguez, "La Real Academia de la Historia Como Modelo entre el Estado y la Cultura," *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea* 8 (1987): 127–55, 146; Eva Velasco Moreno, "Las Academias de la Historia en el Siglo XVIII: Una Comparación entre Francia y España," *El Mundo Hispánico en el Siglo de las Luces* (Madrid, 1996), 1321–38, 1324. On the diversity of academies in eighteenth-century Spain, see Antonio Risco, "Sobre la Noción de 'Academia' en el Siglo XVIII Español," *Boletín del Centro Estudios de Siglo XVIII* [Oviedo] (1983): 36–57.

20. Pocock, 7.

21. Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* [1776] (New York, 2001), 361–62.

22. Antonio Porlier y Sopranis [Marqués de Bajamar], "Speech to the Council of the Indies (1804)," Marqués de Bajamar, *Discursos al Consejo de Indias,* ed. Maria Soledad Campos Díez (Madrid, 2002), 169–70.

23. I do not recapitulate the debate over the introduction of Robertson in Spain, as it already has received thorough treatment by scholars. For an analysis of Robertson's views on Spain, see Brading, *The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots and the Liberal State, 1492–1867* (Cambridge, 1991); on his positive appraisal, see Paquette, "The Image of Imperial Spain in British Political Thought, 1750–1800," *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* 81 no. 2 (2004): 187–214, esp. 202–6; for a brilliant and pioneering treatment of the reception of Robertson in Spain, see Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, *How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies and Identities in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Stanford, 2001).

24. Juan Bautista Muñoz, Letter to King Charles III, 8 June 1779, reproduced in R[eal] A[cademia de] H[istoria], *Catalogo de la Colección de Don Juan Bautista Muñoz: Documentos Interesantes para la Historia de América* (Madrid, 1956), 3:xli–xliii. For a treatment of Muñoz's participation in the various polemics of his epoch, see Carlos William de Onis, "Juan Bautista Muñoz: Ensayista de la Ilustración" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1980), esp. 83–126. The scope of his work, however, led Muñoz's friends, including José Nicolas Azara, to question whether a cogent account would be possible due to the "immense number of subjects, quite disparate, which are treated, and I do not know how it would be possible to bring them together in order to compose an interesting and unified narrative" (qtd. in Antonio Ballesteros Beretta, "Juan Bautista Muñoz: La Creación del Archivo de Indias," *Revista de Indias* 2 (1941): 55–95, 56). His propensity and aptitude for comprehensive collection served him better, however, when he spearheaded the movement to create the Archive of the Indies in Seville, thus realizing his ambition to endow future Spanish historians with a solid documentary foundation for their work: "the true history of the Indies," he predicted in a letter to J. A. Mayans y Siscar in 1782, "will only surface through an analysis of the authentic documents that have not yet been used" (qtd. in Cañizares-Esguerra, 193).

25. Muñoz, *Historia del Nuevo Mundo* (Valencia, 1990), 25. See also Anthony Tudisco, "America in Some Travelers, Historians and Political Economists of the Spanish Eighteenth Century," *The Americas* 15 (1958): 15; and N. Rodríguez, "Robertson, Juan Bautista Muñoz y la Academia de la Historia," *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 187 (1990): 435–56.

26. José de Guevara Vasconcelos, Speech to the Royal Academy of History, 10 November 1791, reproduced in *Catálogo de la Colección de Don Juan Bautista Muñoz,* 3:ci, cxiv.

27. Pedro Francisco Jiménez de Góngora y Luján, Duke of Almodóvar, Letter to R. A. H., 15 November 1791, reproduced in *Catálogo de la Colección de Don Juan Bautista Muñoz,* 3:cxvii.

28. Nicolas Rodríguez Laso, "Elogio Histórico del Excelentísimo Señor Duque de Almodóvar, Director de la Real Academia de la Historia" (Madrid, 1795), x. N. B. the Treaty of San Ildefonso was signed after the fall of Pombal's ministry.

29. On Spanish diplomats in the eighteenth century, see Didier Ozanam, "La Elección de los Diplomáticos Españoles en el Siglo XVIII (1700–1808)," *Sociedad, Administración y Poder en la España del Antiguo Régimen,* ed. J. L. Castellano (Granada, 1996), 11–23, esp. 12–13.

30. A[rchivo] G[eneral de] S[imancas], Estado 7290, Almodóvar to Grimaldi, 20 November 1767. Please note: subsequent references to this archive will be noted as A. G. S.

31. A. G. S., Estado 7005, Almodóvar to Floridablanca, 25 May 1779.

32. Eduardo Malo de Luque [Duke of Almodóvar], *Historia Política de los Establecimientos Ultramarinos de las Naciones Europeas,* 5 vols. (Madrid, 1795), 2: appendix, 5.

33. Almodóvar, *Historia Política,* 2: appendix, 6.

34. Abbé Guillaume-Thomas François Raynal, *A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the Europeans in the East and West Indies,* 3rd ed., trans. J. O. Justamond, 4 vols. (Dublin, 1779), 1, book 2, 224. Justamond completed the English translation of the 12th French edition in 1776. His translation was reviewed favorably in the British press for its accuracy and elegance. On Justamond, see Anthony Strugnell, "La Réception de l'*Histoire des Deux Indes* en Angleterre au Dix-Huitième Siècle," *Lectures de Raynal: L'Histoire des Deux Indes en Europe et en Amérique au XVIII Siècle,* ed. Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink and Manfred Tietz (Oxford, 1991), 256–58.

35. Raynal, 2, book 9, 537.

36. Raynal, 2, book 6, 167.

37. See, for example, Raynal, 2, book 6, 150, 183, 202; 2, book 8, 428–34 passim, 449. For a stimulating recent analysis of the views of Raynal and Diderot on colonies, see Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment Against Empire* (Princeton, 2003), 106.

38. See, for example, Raynal, 2, book 6, 222 and book 8, 424; 2, book 7, 305; 3, book 16, 114; 4, book 19, 513; 3, book 14, 560; 2, book 8, 468–69; 4, book 19, 493; and 2, book 8, 458.

39. Almodóvar, *Historia Política,* 1:v, vii; 2:viii.

40. For a diagrammatic account of the differences between Raynal's and Almodóvar's texts, see Antonio Truyol Serra, "Nota Sobre la Versión Castellana de la Obra de Raynal," *Homenaje al Prof. Carlos Ollero 'Estudios de Ciencia Política y Sociologia'* (Madrid, 1972), 876–78; see also Manfred Tietz, "L'Espagne et l'*Histoire des Deux Indes* de l'abbé Raynal," in Lüsebrink and Tietz, 99–130. N. B.: there may have been personal as well as political-intellectual reasons for Almodóvar's omission of America: he was fully aware that Muñoz had received a commission in 1779 to write a history of America. Fear of redundancy, combined with personal friendship with Muñoz, may help to explain this curious absence.

41. Almodóvar, *Historia Política,* 2: appendix, 8.

42. This theme is addressed in part 4 of this essay.

43. Almodóvar, *Historia Política,* 1:380.

44. Almodóvar, *Historia Política,* 1:192.

45. Almodóvar, *Historia Política,* 2: appendix, vii.

46. Almodóvar, *Historia Política,* 2: appendix, 125.

47. Almodóvar, *Historia Política,* 2: appendix, 209. Additional contemporary Spanish writers criticized Britain for "operating semi-tyrannies in its colonies . . . [by which Britain] has subverted its empire in the Indies"; see B. P. R. II/2866, Josef Fuertes, "Pensamientos, o Proyecto Sobre Volver a Reconciliar con la Madre Patria las Provincias Discolas de la América Meridional" (1781), fos., 248–49 passim. In this way, these writers anticipated Bayly's analysis of British "overseas despotisms" during this period, which were "characterized by a form of aristocratic military government supporting a vice regal autocracy, by a well-developed imperial style which emphasized hierarchy and racial

subordination" (*Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780–1830* [Harlow, 1989], 8).

48. Almodóvar, *Historia Política*, 2: appendix, 4.

49. Almodóvar, *Historia Política*, 2: appendix, 12.

50. Almodóvar, *Historia Política*, 3: appendix, 67.

51. Almodóvar, *Historia Política*, 3: appendix, 68. This view was shared by Almodóvar's contemporaries who inquired "from where are bloody and costly wars between England and France if not from the emulation [*emulación*] which each has for the other's commerce?" (B. P. R. II/2817, Nicolas Norton Nicols, "El Comercio de Manila: las Conveniencias, Beneficio y Utilidad que las Islas Philipinas Deben Dar a S. M. como a sus Vasallos" [n.d., addressed to Charles III], fo. 258v.).

52. Juan Sempere y Guarinos, "Eduardo Malo de Luque," *Ensayo de Una Biblioteca Española de los Mejores Escritores del Reynado de Carlos III* (Madrid, 1786), 4:1.

53. Gaspar Malchor de Jovellanos, quoted in Fernando Baras Escolá, "Política e Historia en la España del Siglo XVIII: Las Concepciones Historiográficas de Jovellanos," *Boletín de la Real Academia de Historia* 191, no. 2 (1994): 351.

54. Almodóvar, *Historia Política*, 5:54.

55. Ovidio García Regueiro, "Intereses Estamentales y Pensamiento Económico: La Versión Española de la 'Historia' de Raynal," *Moneda y Crédito* 149 (1979): 88. In addition to the rapacity of which he accused them, Raynal contended that privileged companies never recovered, through the duties they levied, the money advanced to them; on this theme, see W. R. Womack, "Eighteenth-Century Themes in the *Histoire Philosophique et Politique des Deux Indes* of Guillaume Raynal," *Studies in Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 96 (1972): 129–265.

56. Almodóvar, *Historia Política*, 2: appendix, 23.

57. The secondary literature on Spanish economic debates is vast. Among the best treatments in Spanish are Marcelo Bitar Letayf, *Economistas Espanoles del Siglo XVIII: Sus Ideas sobre la Libertad del Comercio con Indias* (Madrid, 1968); Enrique Fuentes Quintana, ed., *Economía y Economistas Españoles, Volume 3: La Ilustración* (Barcelona, 2000); and Mariano García Ruiperez, "El Pensamiento Economico Ilustrado y las Compañías de Comercio," *Revista de Historia Económica* 4 no. 3 (1986): 521–48. In English, among the best studies are Robert Sidney Smith, "*The Wealth of Nations* in Spain and Hispanic America, 1780–1830," *Journal of Political Economy* 65 no. 1 (1957): 104–25; Stein and Stein, *Apogee of Empire;* and, more generally, Lars Magnusson, *Mercantilism: The Shaping of an Economic Language* (London and New York, 1994).

58. Emma Rothschild, "Global Commerce and the Question of Sovereignty in the Eighteenth-Century Provinces," *Modern Intellectual History* 1 (2004): 3–25, 9.

59. B. P. R. II/2666, Miguel Antonio de Gandara, "Apuntes para Formar un Discurso Sobre el Bien y el Mal de España" (1759), fo. 135.

60. B. P. R. II/2851, [Anon.], "Reflexiones Sobre las Reglas y Medios Verdaderos de Adelantar nuestro Comercio y Notas y Reparos" (1787/1788), fo. 299.

61. Josef Alonso Ortíz, translator's preface, Adam Smith, *Investigación de la Naturaleza y Causas de la Riqueza de las Naciones* (Valladolid, 1794).

62. Almodóvar, *Historia Política,* 5:93, 382–83. For a fuller treatment of Almodóvar's aspirations for a Philippines trading company, see Ovidio García Regueiro, "Manila, Acapulco y Cádiz: Una Concepción del Comercio Español con Oriente en el Siglo XVIII," *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos* 409 (1984): 5–35.

63. Almodóvar, *Historia Política,* 5:334. The originality of Almodóvar's scheme must not be exaggerated. In 1765, Francisco de Leandro de Viana had called for such a company as a bulwark against Dutch and English competition in the Pacific; see W. L. Schurz, "The Royal Philippine Company," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 3 (1920): 491–508, 494.

64. B. P. R. II/2879, Felix de Maquina, "Informe Relativo al Estado de Aquellas Islas, su Fomento y Producciones" (1790), fo. 140v. See Stetson Conn, *Gibraltar in British Diplomacy in the Eighteenth Century* (New Haven, 1942), 220–21.

65. See, for example, Josep M. Fradera, *Filipinas, La Colonia Más Peculiar: La Hacienda Pública en la Definición de la Política Colonial 1762–1868* (Madrid, 1999), 87; B. P. R. II/2851, "Disertación Sobre las Utilidades que Logran los Franceses, Ingleses y Holandeses con su Comercio en el Continente de Asia y las que podrá conseguir la España con este Trafico," fos. 27, 30; Schurz, 498–99; Lourdes Díaz-Trechuelo, "El Comercio de Filipinas durante la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XVIII," *Revista de Indias* 23 (1963): 463–85.

66. A[rchivo] H[istorico] N[acional] (Madrid), Estado 2927, no. 273, [Anon.] "Memoria Sobre las Primeras Operaciones de la Real Compañía de Filipinas y Su Estado Actual," 17 July 1787.

67. P. Michael McKinley, *Pre-Revolutionary Caracas: Politics, Economy and Society 1777–1811* (Cambridge, 1985), 114. On the failure to supply slaves to meet demand in Caracas, see James Ferguson King, "Evolution of the Free Slave Trade Principle in Spanish Colonial Administration," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 22 (1942): 34–56, 49–50.

68. As Vicent Llombart has shown for texts of political economy, there was a rising tide of translations of foreign works into Spanish after 1760: whereas there were a mere nine translations during the 1751–1760 period, the decade 1781–1790 was marked by forty-nine translations ["Traducciones Españolas de Economia Política (1700–1812): Catálogo Bibliográfico y Una Nueva Perspectiva," *Cromohs* 9 (2004): 1–14; http://www.cromohs.unifi.it/9_2004/llombart.html].

69. Stein and Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective* (New York, 1970), 92.